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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
by 
Uchechukwu A. Jarrett 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016 
Under the Supervision of Professor Hamid Mohtadi 
 
The title of this dissertation captures the intent of this study. It centers on aspects of international 
trade and finance and their impact on growth and development. The effect of openness on the 
financial crisis of 2008 which wreaked havoc worldwide on financial and non-financial systems 
alike is examined. It is observed that the role of both financial and trade openness is not constant 
throughout the crisis as was once thought. In addition, and contrary to popular belief, the effect 
of trade openness dominated that of financial openness, suggesting that while a shortcoming in 
the financial markets may have been to blame for the origin of the crisis, the negative 
consequences were spread through trade channels. Due to the increase in risk during this time 
period and the deleterious effects trade openness had on economies the world over, the role of 
risk in trade flow determination is studied. It is determined that risk has a significant impact on 
trade flow determination and as such, has a significant impact on growth rates across different 
countries, with developing countries suffering more due to a higher level of risk than their 
developed counterparts. This dissertation can thus be divided into two subsets. The first of these 
subsets, which is entirely discussed in the first chapter, takes a unique look at the effect of 
openness, both via trade and finance on an economy, paying particular attention to a period in 
iii 
 
time during great recession of 2008 where we know that the detriments of openness were felt the 
world over. The second subset deals with factors that influence a country’s choice in trading 
partners, specifically country specific risk. This is studied by introducing countries’ idiosyncratic 
risk measures to the standard gravity model in order to determine what role risk plays in 
determining trade partnerships. This aspect is addressed in the second chapter while the third 
chapter examines the implication of this finding on growth rates. The implication of these factors 
on the growth rate of the economy through this trade nexus is studied in order to provide a more 
accurate estimate of the contribution of trade to growth rates and propose a reason for differences 
in success rates of trade expansionary policies designed to promote growth, particularly in 
developing countries.  
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Chapter one 
The Transmission of the Great Recession and the Role of Openness: A Counterfactual Diagnosis 
1.1 Introduction 
In early 2015, the volatility spike in stock exchanges across the globe and the corresponding 
decline in commodity prices, a response to the specter of some contraction of the Chinese 
economy, served to remind us once again how vulnerable the world economy could be to the 
propagation of risk. Can we apply the lessons learned from the most recent financial collapse of 
the global economy in 2008 to shed light on a likely propagation of new risk?  Can we, for example, 
identify the path and the nature of this propagation in the sense of determining how and which 
potential countries would be most impacted, based on the type and extent of their relationship with 
China?  
In light of the above, much rides on the accuracy of the retrospective analyses of the 2008 financial 
collapse. I therefore turn my attention to those analyses and find the literature wanting:  As far as 
I can tell, past studies of this subject have used the degree of decline in growth as a measure of the 
impact of a crisis on an economy. A return to pre-crisis growth has then been assumed to indicate 
a return to normalcy.  This approach is limited in three ways; first a return to pre-crisis growth 
rates may be a consequence of a depressed level of output as a result of the crisis and thus, far from 
indicating that the impact of a financial crisis has dissipated. Second, a decline in growth might be 
a natural part of the economy’s progression through its business cycle that would have occurred 
even in the absence of a financial crisis. Thus, attributing this decline to the crisis can potentially 
overestimate the impact of the crisis or underestimate its duration. Third, this traditional measure 
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of impact does not capture the effects of the crisis on the other macroeconomic variables that are 
also impacted by the crisis.  
 To address these deficiencies, I propose an alternative approach: First, I predict counterfactual 
levels of output (and hence growth) for the post crisis era (post 2007) as if the financial crisis of 
2008 never took place. The impact of the crisis in each country for each time period is then defined 
as the difference between the predicted counterfactual GDP and the observed GDP. This new 
approach enables us to study the role of the suspected factors in influencing the impact of the crisis 
on output and on growth. Put succinctly, I empirically investigate the potential for evolving roles 
of trade and financial openness from the onset of the financial crisis, using a more accurate measure 
of the impact of the financial crisis on output level and growth. This will allow us to identify its 
effects on the economies studied, and as such, highlight policy implications in the advent of 
another recession.    
The effects of the financial crisis in the late 2000s were profound and far reaching. Among 
scholars, they generated much interest in the study of crises, from the factors that cause financial 
collapse, to methods of prediction, to pathways of contagion. In this paper, the focus is primarily 
on the pathways of contagion. Financial crises can be attributed to the presence of systemic risk, 
stemming from an external shock that affects markets that co-move or, a failure of a particular 
system that spreads akin to a disease, infecting other systems to which it is connected. While 
studying an external shock can be managed by identifying causal factors that could lead to system 
failures, contagion can only be studied by examining the pathways through which systems are 
connected. The analogy between the spread of systemic risk and a disease is apt as much of the 
blame for the propagation of systemic risk has fallen on the type and extent of the relationship 
between market systems, specifically openness. Proponents of openness argue that it is a vital tool 
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in the mitigation of idiosyncratic risk and as such, push for policies that promote openness. Critics 
of openness, on the other hand, view it as the channel through which a crisis is spread and advocate 
for policies against it.   
Given the fact that the 2008 financial crisis began with the bursting of the housing market bubble 
in the US and spread to other markets within and outside the US via housing related derivatives 
(e.g., MBS), financial openness has been identified as the culprit for the spread of the “disease” to 
other parts of the world.  While a complete return to autarky may have protected countries against 
these adverse effects, such a strategy would not have aided in mitigating idiosyncratic risks during 
periods of regular economic activity. Does this then imply that countries should take up a position 
at the other end of the spectrum and become completely open?  Either extreme is unlikely to be 
the answer. This then prompts the question: just how open is too open? This question may be quite 
difficult to answer categorically and is likely to depend both on the “state” of the economy and the 
“pathways” of contagion.  In this paper, I study the pathways of contagion themselves and as with 
any other disease, will try to identify (a) how the “disease” is transmitted and (b) how the pathways 
of contagion contribute to the impact of the crisis on the host. With openness as the prime suspect, 
I look at the two variants of openness that may be associated with the propagation of a crisis: trade 
openness and financial openness.  
In contrast to previous studies, my approach allows us to ask, among other things, whether the role 
of openness in the financial crisis was an “asymmetric” one, i.e. whether over time openness was 
transmuted from a “vector” contributed to the transmission of the crisis to a “remedy” that 
mitigated the negative effect of the crisis. Establishing this result would suggest policies that 
change over shorter periods of time during the crisis to take advantage of this asymmetry, instead 
of static policies implemented throughout the duration of the crisis, consequently slowing down 
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the return to normalcy. It would also help to determine what type of openness – trade or finance- 
has more of an impact as a vector and a remedy. Answering this question also has critical policy 
implications. For, it tells us whether countries must opt to become more (less) open via trade or 
finance in times of crises when becoming more (less) open is deemed viable. This study can thus 
provide invaluable insights towards developing efficient policies to account for openness in both 
the presence and absence of crises, bringing us one step closer to answering that ever illusive 
question of how open is too open. The brief summary of the literature which follows is by no 
means exhaustive, but serves first to point out the different views on the effects of the different 
kinds of openness on an economy; second, to show the need for the consideration of both types of 
openness in the analysis; and third, to highlight the gap in the literature and thus the contribution 
of this paper. 
Stiglitz (1999) highlighted the dangers of premature financial market liberalization, pointing out 
that financial openness, while appropriate for economies with strong regulatory structures may 
harm those without such institutions, leading to risky lending behavior by banks faced with a 
sudden influx of capital. Examining the Asian financial crisis of the late 90s in this light, Stiglitz 
casts doubt on the efficacy of financial liberalization favoring trade openness instead. Hamdi and 
Jlassi (2014) studied 58 developing economies between 1984 and 2007 to determine whether 
financial liberalization led to any of the banking crises that occurred within that time period. Using 
a panel logit estimation procedure, they find no relationship between financial openness and 
crises.1  
                                                          
1 The authors did show however that foreign debt liabilities and foreign direct investment liabilities increased the 
likelihood of a banking crisis. 
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Cavallo and Frankel (2008) used annual data for all countries listed on the IMF financial statistics 
database between 1970 and 2002 to find that trade openness reduces the impact of a crisis, 
suggesting a restorative role of trade openness during a crisis. A contradictory view was suggested 
by Classens et. al. (2010), who used a cross sectional dataset from 58 countries to study the impact 
of certain factors on the depth and the duration of the 2008 financial crises and found that an 
increase in trade openness led to increase both the duration and the severity of the financial crisis 
across countries. Classens et. al. (2012) presented further confirmation of this view by using 
accounting data from non-financial firms in 42 countries between 2007 and 2009 to show that the 
crisis had a larger negative impact on firms in countries that are more open to trade while financial 
openness had little to no contribution.  
Ranciere et. al. (2006) addressed the question of the dual nature of financial openness by 
disaggregating the contribution of financial openness to growth and to the occurrence of financial 
crises. Using a panel dataset of 60 countries between 1980 and 2002, they find that the direct effect 
of financial openness on growth is much greater than a potential adverse indirect effect that might 
lead to a financial crisis. In other words, the authors suggest that the benefits of financial openness 
far outweigh the costs, corroborating the conclusions of Schmukler (2004) whose literature review 
on various studies on the benefits and risks of financial globalization, point to the conclusion that 
the net effect of financial openness is likely to be positive in the long run. Finally, Ozkan and Unsal 
(2012) contribute theoretically to the literature on systemic risk contagion. They develop a two 
country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to investigate the contagion effects of 
systemic risk, taking both trade and financial linkages into account, particularly mimicking the 
events of the 2008 crisis which showed a transfer from developed to developing economies. They 
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find that the lower the level of openness (both financial and trade), the lower the impact of the 
crisis.  
It is by now evident that the existing literature yields conflicting results on the relationship between 
the effect of openness in a crisis, depending on the time frame, the measure chosen, the approach 
taken, and the countries studied.  Besides these sources of variation, however, these studies share 
several common substantive shortcomings that I address presently.  
One issue is using the drop in growth rate as a measure for the impact of a crisis, and assuming 
that this drop is entirely due to the crisis. This ignores the business cycle effects.2 The second issue 
is the implicit assumption that financial crisis does not have a  lasting effect on the level of output. 
In the case of the Great Recession for example, most studies assume that the effects of the crisis 
ended a short time afterwards. However, if it should turn out that financial crisis altered the overall 
trend of output, it would follow that a much longer return time to the pre-crisis path may be needed. 
The third issue is that a return to pre-crisis growth rates may be the result of depressed output, 
brought on by the financial crisis. This would overstate the growth rate, given that the base output 
is lower. In this case, a return to pre-crisis growth rates do not necessarily imply a return to the 
pre-crisis state (output level).   
I address these shortcomings by predicting counterfactual levels of output (and growth) for the 
post crisis era (2008 to 2013) from pre-crisis data as if the financial crisis of 2008 never took place. 
The impact of the crisis in each country for each time period is then measured by the difference 
                                                          
2 To illustrate how this leads to a bias in measuring the role of trade in the transmission of crisis, consider an open 
agrarian economy with peak harvest periods of higher than average output and the exporting of the excess, and a 
planting season with a dip in output and thus of importing the shortage. Associating this regular decline in output to 
the crisis will (a) overestimate the impact of the crisis and (b) provide false evidence of a relationship between the 
crisis and trade. 
7 
 
between the predicted counterfactual output and the observed output. This enables us study the 
impact of openness on the effect of the crisis alone, without the inclusion of regular cyclical 
declines in output. In this way, I am able to extract the potential dynamic relationship between 
openness and the impact of the financial crisis on growth and output separately over time, instead 
of lumping them together.  
These modifications highlight my main contribution. As far as I know, the drop in output and in 
growth rate have not been disentangled in studying the overall effect of the crisis, and the effect of 
the financial crisis on output has not been studied previously. The closest studies to mine 
nonetheless differ from mine in several significant ways. For example, a study by Furceri and 
Mourougane (2012) that considers the effects of financial crises in OECD countries between 1960 
and 2008 focus on potential output estimates whereas I focus on observed output. A study by 
Berkmen et. al. (2009) that also examines the impact of the 2008 financial crisis focuses on growth 
rate, not on output level, but even then it uses growth forecast revisions by field experts in a static 
cross country context, rather than in a dynamic setting. Finally, a study by Gupta et al. (2007) that 
measures the effect of currency crises in developing countries between 1970 and 2000 bears some 
resemblance to mine but also differs from mine in one fundamental respect. Gupta et al. estimate 
a trend and then measure the annual deviation from that trend to capture the cycle. They then use 
the change in this measure at times of currency crises as an indication of the effect of the currency 
crisis. Here, the key difference with my methodology is that by estimating a counterfactual in 
projecting estimated output and growth, my approach allows for the possibility of changes in the 
trend itself while theirs does not. 
What remains is organized as follows; section 2 discusses the data and estimation procedures used 
for both the prediction of the counterfactual output, as well as the analysis of the relationship 
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between openness and the crisis. Section 3 discusses the estimation results and robustness checks. 
Section 4 concludes. 
1.2. Data and Estimation Procedures 
1.2.1 Data 
As with most empirical studies, the problem of data availability is present in this analysis. To 
overcome this problem, I use two datasets: Annual and quarterly. Each has its own advantage; the 
quarterly data yields fewer countries but more time entries (large N and large T setup); the annual 
data yields more countries and less time entries (Large N and small T setup). Both datasets are 
analyzed using different procedures designed to handle the varying country and time sizes. The 
annual dataset consists of 50 countries between 2008 and 2013, and the quarterly dataset consists  
of 30 countries between the first quarter of 2008 and the fourth quarter of 20133. Output is 
measured by real gross domestic product and growth is measured by the change in output between 
any two time periods. 
1.2.1.1 Measure of financial openness  
There are two main measures of financial openness used in this paper; a de-facto measure which 
captures the actual flow of financial capital across countries, and a de-jure measure which 
measures the restrictions placed on capital mobility across countries. The de-facto measure is 
obtained by aggregating a country’s total international investment position, which is a sum of its 
external assets and liabilities4 as a fraction of its GDP, in line with the Lane-Milesi-Ferretti (2001) 
definition. This implies that quarterly, as well as annual observations of this measure of financial 
                                                          
3 A full list of the data used as well as their sources can be found in table A.2 of Appendix 1. 
4 Assets and liabilities used here are sums of both direct investment and portfolio investment 
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openness can be obtained. The de-jure measure is one developed by Chinn and Ito (2006). 
However, this measure is only an annual measure and has no quarterly equivalent. Figure 1 below 
summarizes the average de-facto financial openness measures for the 50 countries used in this 
analysis. 
Figure 1: Average financial openness over time 
 
1.2.1.2 Measure of Trade openness 
The measure of trade openness used in this paper is the sum of exports and imports as a fraction 
of GDP, which allows for a quarterly and an annual measure. As with all measures of trade 
openness, there are potential issues with this measure, primarily the fact that this measure only 
captures a country’s level of integration in international markets and not its trade policies that 
might hold more information about its attitude towards openness. An example of this might be a 
country that has limited resources and has no choice but to engage in importation to sustain itself. 
This country would appear open to trade using this measure, but might have very strict export 
restrictions that might make its measure of openness lower using other trade measures. An ideal 
alternative measure for trade openness would be the tariffs placed on goods in each country. The 
10 
 
problem with this is that these tariff measures depend on what each country can produce and the 
preferences of its constituents. As a result, it provides no real comparison across countries and fails 
to measure the extent of a country’s integration in the international market, but provides 
information on trade policies (regarding certain goods). Ultimately the measure of trade openness 
used here is because of its availability, its measure of the level of integration and for easier 
comparison to other works in the literature. Figure two below captures the average measure of 
Trade openness for the 50 countries used in this study. 
Figure 2: Average trade openness over time 
 
In the following sub-sections, I examine the estimation procedures that will be applied to both data 
sets. First, I discuss the procedure used in estimating the effect of the crisis on both the growth rate 
and the output level. Next, I discuss the Arellano Bond GMM approach to estimating the annual 
dataset, and finally, the application of the pooled mean group estimate (PMG) to the quarterly 
dataset. 
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1.2.2 Measuring the impact of the crisis 
I estimate the counterfactual GDP for a different panel of countries for both the annual and 
quarterly datasets in order to take advantage of the differing measures of openness available at the 
annual level, and the increase in the number of time parameters at the quarterly level thereby 
getting a better fit for each dataset. Using pre crisis data5, I fit an Auto regressive (AR) model to 
GDP and then forecast post crisis GDP using 2007 observed data and the same estimated AR 
specification.  The Schwarz information criterion (SIC) is used in selecting the appropriate AR 
model6. This way, the pre-crisis pattern is not broken due to the financial crisis thus generating 
counterfactual estimates. However, these estimates are subject to prediction errors, which I 
subsequently correct for, i.e.  
, , ,
A P P
i t i t i tY Y   for pre-crisis data where,       (1) 
Where, ,
A
i tY  is the observed pre crisis GDP for country i at time t; t = 1980 to 2007 for annual data 
and 1996 second quarter to 2007 fourth quarter for quarterly data; ,
P
i tY is the predicted GDP value 
for country i at time t using the determined pre-crisis AR process as described above;  ,
P
i t  is the 
prediction error for country i at time t in the pre-crisis period.  In order to generate a more accurate 
value for the predicted GDP for the crisis period, I first generate an average prediction error for 
each country from the pre-crisis period,   
,
1
1 T P P
i t i
tT
 

 for each country i,         (2) 
                                                          
5 1980 to 2007 for annual dataset and second quarter in 1996 to fourth quarter in 2007 for the quarterly dataset  
6 usually the one with the smallest SIC value 
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and then augment the initial counterfactual estimates with this estimated prediction errors. I simply 
add the estimate of each country’s prediction error p
i to the initial forecasts ,
if
i sY , i.e. 
, ,
ff if p
i s i s iY Y             (3) 
where,  ,
ff
i sY  is the final forecast value of post crisis GDP, and s = 2007 to 2013 for both annual 
and quarterly data; ,
if
i sY  is the initial forecast value of post crisis GDP from the pre-crisis AR 
process 
These predicted values capture an approximate pattern of the pre-crisis GDP, including the trend 
and cycle behavior, the same pattern that would exist in the post-crisis GDP pattern. This is in 
opposition to a trend-cycle decomposition which does not allow for a deviation from a trend in the 
post crisis period due to the impact of the crisis.  This makes taking the difference between the 
post crisis estimates and the observed post-crisis values a more accurate measure of the impact of 
the crisis. As such, the impact of the crisis for observations after the crisis is given as; 
, , ,
ff A
i t i t i tDLevel Y Y   (for GDP level) and       (4)  
, , ,
ff A
i t i t i tDGrowth Y Y   (for GDP growth) where  indicates first difference   (5) 
,i tDLevel is the difference between the predicted and observed level of GDP for country i at time 
t (measure of the impact on output) 
,i tDGrowth is the difference in the predicted and observed growth rate  of GDP for country i at 
time t (measure of the impact on growth) 
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1.2.2.1 Robustness checks for the measures of the impact of the financial crisis  
1.2.2.1.1 Testing the significance of the measure 
Now that I have established the AR specification and estimated the counterfactuals for the post-
crisis period, I determine their signs and test that they are significantly different from zero. Since 
the output level and growth rates fell below the norm during the crisis, one would expect positive 
and statistically significant measures of Dlevel and DGrowth 7. Figures 3 through 6 below depict 
the average of the estimated variables Dlevel and DGrowth  for all countries in this study over 
time for both the quarterly and annual datasets, i.e. I define the average of the measures Dlevel  
and DGrowth  as it such that 
1
1
11
1
N
t kt
k
Dlevel
N


  , for t  from 2008 to 2013, and 1N  = 50 
1
2
11
1
N
t kt
k
DGrowth
N


  , for t  from 2009 to 2013, and 1N = 50  
2
3
12
1
N
t kt
k
Dlevel
N


  , for t  from first quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 2013, and 2N = 30 
2
4
12
1
N
t kt
k
DGrowth
N


  , for t  from second quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 2013, and 2N = 30  
Figures 3 through 6 suggest that on average, countries have not returned to their pre-crisis paths 
of output8, but have returned to, and may have even surpassed their pre-crisis growth rates9. Since 
                                                          
7 Since they are defined as Counterfactual – Observed, where counterfactual is the estimate of the norm 
8 Positive measure of average Dlevel  
9 Negative measure of average DGrowth   
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output levels dropped, this accelerated growth is expected in order for countries to return to their 
pre-crisis paths of output. Next, I determine the statistical significance of these estimates. To do 
this, I simply test the following hypotheses: 
0 1 1: 0; : 0t A tH H   for t : 2008 to 2013  
0 2 2: 0; : 0t A tH H   for t : 2009 to 2013 
0 3 3: 0; : 0t A tH H   for t : Q1 of 2008 to Q4 of 2013 
0 4 4: 0; : 0t A tH H   for t : Q2 of 2008 to Q4 of 2013 
  Figure 3: Average Dlevel  for Annual data            Figure 4: Average DGrowth  for Annual data 
       
Figure 5: Average Dlevel  for quarterly data        Figure 6: Average DGrowth  for quarterly data 
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The results of the tests above are summarized in tables 1 and 2 below for Annual and quarterly 
data respectively. 
Table 1: Significance tests of means for Annual dataset 
year Average of Dlevel 1t  Average of DGrowth 2t  
2008 0.0125781***  
2009 0.0639665*** 0.0513885*** 
2010 0.0499264*** -0.0140402* 
2011 0.0439431** -0.0059833 
2012 0.0475517* 0.0036086 
2013 0.0450365 -0.0025152 
 
Table 1 above shows that on average, the Dlevel measure is significantly different from zero from 
2008 to 2012, but not significantly different from zero in 2013. This coupled with the declining 
level of certainty levels for which the alternative hypothesis is preferred over the null, suggests 
that countries are indeed returning to their pre-crisis paths and may have finally done so in 2013.  
Table 2: Significance tests of means for Quarterly data 
Quarter Average of Dlevel 3t  Average of DGrowth 4t  
2008Q1 0.0072898**  
2008Q2 0.0161735*** 0.0088837*** 
2008Q3 0.0284461*** 0.0122726*** 
2008Q4 0.0591307*** 0.0306846*** 
2009Q1 0.0946953*** 0.0355646*** 
2009Q2 0.1010901*** 0.0063948* 
2009Q3 0.1030475*** 0.0019575 
2009Q4 0.1061131*** 0.0030655** 
2010Q1 0.1103523*** 0.0042393* 
2010Q2 0.1075974*** -0.002755 
2010Q3 0.1124677*** 0.0048703** 
2010Q4 0.1136581*** 0.0011903 
2011Q1 0.1176826*** 0.0040246* 
2011Q2 0.1237616*** 0.0060789*** 
2011Q3 0.1297985*** 0.0060369*** 
2011Q4 0.1377528*** 0.0079543*** 
2012Q1 0.1478687*** 0.0101159*** 
2012Q2 0.1575301*** 0.0096613*** 
2012Q3 0.1652186*** 0.0076885*** 
2012Q4 0.1756748*** 0.0104562*** 
2013Q1 0.1833594*** 0.0076846*** 
2013Q2 0.1897645*** 0.0064052*** 
2013Q3 0.1939742*** 0.0042097* 
2013Q4 0.1994969*** 0.0055227*** 
For tables 2 and 3, *,**, and *** signify significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. t tests 
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This implies that the financial crisis of 2008 lasted, at least in this group of countries till 2012 
which I will abide by during my analysis of the annual dataset. The average DGrowth measure 
from Table 1 which is significant only in 2009 and 2010 suggests that this group of countries on 
average returned to their pre-crisis path of growth much quicker than output, implying that the 
financial crisis lasted till 2010, which is the general view adopted by others in the literature. Table 
2 above shows stronger significance of both the Dlevel and DGrowth measures than the findings 
in Table 1, which suggests that on average, these countries are still yet to return to their quarterly 
pre-crisis paths of both output and growth, as both average measures are positive10 and statistically 
significant. Tables 1 and 2 provide evidence that the effects of the financial crisis of 2008 lasted 
beyond 2010 for these countries under investigation, at least where the level of output is concerned.  
 
1.2.2.1.2 Why trust these counterfactuals estimates? 
The claim that these measures better capture the impact of the financial crisis on output and growth 
depends on how well the AR specification estimated for the progression of Output (and therefore 
growth) fits the observed data. An alternate approach would have been to use output and growth 
forecasts by recognized economic research institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) as post crisis counterfactual measures. The IMF in a particular year uses the observed 
growth rates for the two preceding years to predict the growth rates for each country over the next 
six years11. My claim is that my “in-sample” estimation yields a closer match to the actual 
progression of GDP than the IMF’s out of sample forecasts. In essence, I cheat and in fact, suggest 
that cheating in this case gives rise to more accurate counterfactuals necessary for my analysis. To 
                                                          
10 Recall that, a positive measure of Dlevel or DGrowth  implies that the counterfactual estimate is greater than 
the observed. 
11 Theirs is also an AR(2) Model 
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examine the potential accuracy of my “retrospective” counterfactual, I determine how well my AR 
specification performs by comparing the forecasts of the IMF to my predicted estimates of annual12 
pre-crisis growth and the observed pre-crisis data. Since at the time of forecasting, the IMF had 
less information than I do now, I expect that my estimates – as they are obtained using in-sample 
observations – would better match the observed growth data than the IMF’s Forecasts. It is useful 
to think of the IMF forecasts as the absolute lower bound that my model has to at least match to 
be useful in this analysis and the observed data as the absolute upper bound. As a result, I first 
compare estimates of growth rates for the following years: 1990 – 1995, 1995 – 2000, 2000 – 2005 
to the observed data, and second, compare my estimates to those of the IMF. Figures 7, 8 and 9 
below show the average predictions and observed growth rates for the three time periods examined. 
        Figure 7: 1990 – 1995 predictions       Figure 8: 1995 – 2000 predictions 
                  
          
 
 
                                                          
12 The IMF does not provide quarterly forecasts so we are limited to comparing just the annual estimates  
18 
 
Figure 9: 2000 – 2005 predictions 
 
From the figures above, it appears that my estimates mimic the behavior of the observed growth 
rates better than the IMF forecasts, but to see if the difference is statistically significant, I test the 
correlation of the predictive models with the observed data and with each other, in order to 
determine which model does a better job of matching observed growth rates. If 
,
est
i tg is my growth 
rate prediction, 
,
imf
i tg is the IMF predicted growth rate and ,
obs
i tg is the observed growth rate, for 
country i at time t , the following table summarizes the accuracy of both models when predicting 
observed annual growth rates. A positive and statistically significant correlation coefficient closer 
to one (the 45-degree equality line) when compared with the observed growth rates will indicate a 
higher level of accuracy of the model while a negative or statistically insignificant correlation 
coefficient indicates poor performance. 
From columns 2 and 3 of table 3, my model is positive and statistically significant (PSS) 13 out of 
the 18 years examined, while the IMF forecasts are PSS only 11 out of the 18 years forecasted. Of 
the 13 years my model is PSS, 10 of them show a higher correlation coefficient with the observed 
data than the IMF forecasts. Column 4 highlights the correlation between my forecasts and those 
of the IMF. This column indicates that about 50% of the time, my forecasts and those of the IMF 
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are correlated, all be it when both are more correlated with the observed data. These results suggest 
that my “in-sample” estimates on average do better at matching the observed pre-crisis data than 
the IMF’s out of sample forecasts as expected and as suggested by figures 3 through 5.  
Table 3: Predictive model analysis 
Year ( , )EST OBSCorr g g  ( , )IMF OBSCorr g g  ( , )EST IMFCorr g g  N 
1990 0.6941* 0.7765* 0.6531* 41 
1991 0.5887* 0.4907* 0.3614* 41 
1992 0.6265* 0.4681* 0.4282* 41 
1993 0.4894* 0.3920* 0.4153 41 
1994 0.197 0.2979 0.3554* 41 
1995 0.3888* 0.5459* 0.1648 41 
1995 0.5537* 0.5741* 0.4354* 46 
1996 0.3306* 0.2571 0.2721 46 
1997 0.5891* -0.01 0.0463 46 
1998 0.3681* -0.4486* -0.0854 46 
1999 0.2820 -0.0371 -0.4691* 46 
2000 0.278 0.2383 -0.0403 46 
2000 0.5222* 0.5148* 0.7242* 47 
2001 -0.237 0.0395 0.1752 47 
2002 0.2107 0.6404* 0.0808 47 
2003 0.6183* 0.5022* 0.574* 47 
2004 0.5770* 0.5295* 0.4495* 47 
2005 0.5512* 0.5051* 0.4598* 47 
* here represents a statistically significant correlation coefficient at the 95% level confidence interval 
In addition, the fact that the AR specification employed by the IMF in predicting these growth 
rates is not readily available, therefore making post-crisis counterfactual estimation that much 
harder, makes my estimates the better choice for this analysis. 
1.2.2.1.3 Why trust these as measures of the impact of a crisis? 
Before this new measure is ratified as an improvement over the traditional measure, one 
question still remains: How certain is it that this deviation from the norm is due to the financial 
crisis of 2008 and not some random effect that is a result of left over prediction errors? In order to 
provide an answer to this question, I carry out a “falsification” test by assuming (erroneously, of 
course) that there was a financial crisis in 2003. I therefore follow the same process and estimate 
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counterfactuals for the post 2003 periods and compare my estimates to the observed data. If this 
procedure is truly representative of the impact of the crisis, I would expect to capture the “boom” 
that existed before the “bust” in 2008. This should manifest as higher observed output levels than 
the estimated counterfactuals, leading to negative estimates of Dlevel . Figure 10 below shows 
both the counterfactual estimates and the observed data under this erroneous assumption. I can 
clearly observe that the counterfactual estimates are consistently lower up till 2007, depicting 
evidence of the price boom.  
Figure 10: Falsification tests 
 
Lastly, I show that this difference between the counterfactuals and the observed data is negative 
and statistically significant.  
Table 4: Significance of falsification tests 
Year Average  
Counterfactual 
Average 
Observed 
Average (Counterfactual – 
Observed) 
N 
2003 25.52304 25.53312 -0.0100758*** 50 
2004 25.55187 25.58544 -0.0335672*** 50 
2005 25.5802 25.63136 -0.0511539*** 50 
2006 25.60799 25.68331 -0.0753218*** 50 
2007 25.63522 25.73839 -0.1031708*** 50 
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Table 4 above captures the tests of the differences between counterfactual and observed data across 
time and it can be observed that all differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. When 
I consider the fact that starting in 2008 the signs are positive and significant, it suffices to say that 
this measure indeed captures the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the countries studied.  
1.2.3 Annual Data Estimation Procedure 
The following two regression equations are individually estimated for the annual panel dataset to 
capture the effect of both types of openness on the impact of a financial crisis, using both the level 
and the growth rate of GDP:  
, 1 1 , 2 , ,i t i i t i t i tDLevel TO FO              (6) 
, 2 3 , 4 , ,i t i i t i t i tDGrowth TO FO              (7) 
Where, 
1 2&i i  are the individual country specific fixed effects of country i with respect to GDP and 
growth respectively 
,i tTO is the measure of trade openness for country i at time t and 
,i tFO  is the measure of financial openness for country i at time t  
To eliminate the country fixed effects, the first difference of each equation is taken and given as 
, 1 , 2 , 1 ,i t i t i t i tDLevel TO FO               (8) 
, 3 , 4 , 2 ,i t i t i t i tDGrowth TO FO               (9) 
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The problem with estimating these equations as they are is that there is a potential for the violation 
of the orthogonality condition, i.e.    , , , ,, 0 and , 0i t i t i t i tCov TO Cov FO       . This 
potential violation is due to the fact that a change in openness could cause a change in the error 
terms
1 , 2 ,&i t i t   , implying a correlation between the independent variable and the error term. 
Drawing again on the earlier agrarian economy example, a change in openness could result in the 
acquisition of sophisticated farming equipment that could lead to a boost in output and growth. 
This could in turn, close the gap between predicted and actual GDP much quicker, implying that 
there is a correlation between the change in openness and the change in the shock to GDP.  To 
address this issue, I use the Arellano and Bond general method of moments (GMM) estimation 
procedure. It makes use of an instrument variable
,i tz , which consists of t-1 lags of the regressors 
such that  , ,,i t i tCov z  = 0. This provides better estimates of 'i s and avoids the problem of weak 
instruments. In this paper, I use the first lag of financial openness and trade openness only as 
instruments, as there is no weak instrument problem by definition. This also enables us utilize as 
much of the dataset as possible. I allow for heteroscedasticity across countries by using the 
weighting matrix suggested by Arellano and Bond. A positive and statistically significant 
coefficient on either openness measure would mean an increase in openness, increases 
,i tDLevel
(or 
,i tDGrowth ), which implies a larger impact on the economy for both output level and growth, 
hence, a PSS coefficient implies a deleterious effect of openness on the economy, and a negative 
coefficient implies a positive contribution.  
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1.2.4  Quarterly data estimation 
With the increased number of time observations in the quarterly dataset and the decrease in the 
interval between each observation when compared to the annual dataset, a different approach is 
called for to better examine the relationship between the deviation from the predicted values and 
the openness measures. I consider an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) specification, which 
is more suitable because, given the smaller interval between observations in this dataset; lags of 
both the dependent and independent variables might affect the present level of deviation. I simplify 
the analysis by once again considering just the first lag of both dependent and independent 
variables. I justify this with the fact that the data on GDP of the economies studied in this paper 
follow an AR (1) process13, which implies that the ARDL specification should contain at most one 
lag of the dependent variable. This also provides an extra advantage that enables us to utilize as 
much of the data in the sample as possible with the loss of only one “time” observation. As a result, 
I estimate the following equation: 
, 1 1 , 1 10 , 11 , 1 20 , 21 , 1 1 ,i t i i i t i i t i i t i i t i i t i tDLevel DLevel TO TO FO FO                 10 
, 2 2 , 1 10 , 11 , 1 20 , 21 , 1 2 ,' ' ' 'i t i i i t i i t i i t i i t i i t i tDGrowth DGrowth TO TO FO FO                11 
These yield the error correction re-parameterization estimation equations written as 
 , 1 , 1 0 1 , 2 , 11 , 21 , 1 ,i t i i t i i i t i i t i i t i i t i tDLevel DLevel TO FO TO FO                  12 
 , 2 , 1 0 1 , 2 , 11 , 21 , 2 ,i t i i t i i i t i i t i i t i i t i tDGrowth DGrowth TO FO TO FO                 13 
                                                          
13 See table A.3 in Appendix 1 
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Where  1 11i i    ; 10
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1 2&i i  are the error correction speed of adjustment parameters that signify a return to some 
equilibrium level (0 in this case). 1i and 2i are the long run coefficients of trade and financial 
openness respectively for deviation from output level and 11i and 21i are the short run coefficients 
of trade and financial openness respectively, for deviation from output level. 1i and 2i  are long 
run coefficients of trade and financial openness and 11i and 21i are short run coefficients of trade 
and financial openness respectively for deviation from growth. If 1 2 and i i  are insignificant, it 
implies no adjustment on the part of the dependent variable with respect to changes in the  
independent variables, meaning no effect of openness on the deviations from output level and 
growth due to the financial crisis. The pooled mean group estimation procedure proposed by 
Pesaran, Shinn and Smith (1999) is used to estimate equations 12 and 13 above. The pooled mean 
group estimator allows for variability in the short term behavior in each country but assumes long 
run similarities. This is better suited to my needs as I accept the fact that countries are 
heterogeneous, but assume that all countries in the sample should eventually return to their pre-
crisis paths of output and growth. The heterogeneity across countries is taken care off in the 
estimation of the constant terms 0i and 0i  as they represent estimates of country fixed effects for
Dlevel and DGrowth respectively.  This PMG estimation method adds an extra dimensionality to 
my study. It is possible to observe the short run and long run effects of openness on the impact of 
a financial crisis to determine if there is a change in effect as time progresses. 
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1.3. Results 
1.3.1 Annual data  
For this dataset, I estimate the pre-crisis AR model using all 50 countries between 1980 and 2007. 
This process is used in the counterfactual estimation of GDP for 2008 to 201214. Table A.3 in 
appendix 1 shows that the best fit for this dataset is an AR (2) process. Table 5 below summarizes 
the result of the regression estimates for equations 8 and 9. From table 5 below, an increase in 
trade openness reduces the DLevel and DGrowth measures, implying a positive impact of trade 
openness during the financial crisis. The de-facto financial measure of openness however, has a 
positive effect on growth and a negative impact on output during the financial crisis, while the de-
jure measure has a positive impact on output but no effect on growth. This difference might be due 
to the fact that the de-jure measure captures the willingness of countries to allow foreign 
investments within their borders, while the de-facto measure is an overall measure of existing 
levels of integration (both within and outside their borders). I also account for possible policies 
which may change over time and might have an impact on a country’s ability to overcome the 
negative effects of the financial crisis. I do this by introducing time fixed effects to capture both 
observed and unobserved factors that are specific to different time periods, which could have 
influenced the return to pre-crisis paths of output and growth. It stands to reason that changes in 
these policies over time are not consistent across economies and as such, I address this by assuming 
heteroscedasticity in the error term. The inclusion of time fixed effects (TFE) in the analysis do 
not alter the earlier findings, suggesting that the effect of trade openness and both measures of 
financial openness on the impact of the financial crisis is robust to these changing policies. 
                                                          
14 We stop at 2012 as the annual data suggests that countries on average have converged to the pre-crisis output path 
by 2013, and as such is not included in the analysis 
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Table 5: Trade and Financial openness and the Economic Crisis: Annual data 
 DLEVEL DGROWTH 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
TO -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.37*** -0.09** -0.42*** -0.09** 
FO 0.03*** 0.016***   -0.07*** -0.04***   
FOC   -0.11*** -0.08**   0.02 0.07 
TFE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Estimating equations 8 and 9, using Arellano-Bond GMM estimation procedure 
TO is trade openness, FO is de-facto measure of financial openness, FOC is the Chinn-Ito de-jure measure of 
financial openness and TFE signifies the inclusion of time fixed effects. 
 
3.2 Quarterly data 
For this dataset which consists of 30 countries with time periods between the first quarter of 2008 
and the fourth quarter of 2013, I once again fit an AR model to the progression of GDP using data 
from the same set of countries between the second quarter of 1996 and the fourth quarter of 2007. 
Table A.3 of appendix 1 shows that this dataset is best described by an AR (1) process. Table 6 
below summarizes the findings from the analysis of the quarterly data set.  
Table 6: Trade and Financial openness and the Economic Crisis: Quarterly data 
Variable DLEVEL DGROWTH 
  -0.095*** -0-091*** -0.817*** -0.813*** 
TO 0.057 0.141 0.013 0.0495** 
FO -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.00004 -0.00002 
0  
0.017*** 0.015***   
0  
  0.004*** 0.00066 
TO  -0.464*** -0.469*** -0.495*** -0.499*** 
FO  -0.008 -0.008 -0.0095 -0.0092 
TFE NO YES NO YES 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Estimating equations 12 and 13 using Pesaran et. al. Pooled mean group (PMG) estimation procedure 
TO is trade openness, FO is de-facto measure of financial openness,  is the speed of convergence, 0  and 0  are 
the estimated country fixed effects for DLevel and DGrowth respectively and TFE signifies the inclusion of time 
fixed effects 
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The results show convergence to the pre-crisis path, with evidence of trade openness in the short 
run encouraging a return to the pre-crisis path of output and growth. There is no initial long run 
trade openness effect on convergence to the pre-crisis path of growth, but an inclusion of time 
fixed effects reveals a negative impact of trade openness. This could be due to some unobserved 
factor working to nullify the negative effects of trade openness on growth, but when the time fixed 
effects are introduced, which accounts for this unobserved factor, the true relationship between 
trade openness and the impact of the crisis on growth is revealed. The results from table 6 above 
also indicate a robust positive long run effect of financial openness on a return to pre-crisis output 
path, and no short run relationship. There is however, no short or long run effect of financial 
openness on the growth rate. These results seem to suggest that post-crisis production was 
stimulated by both trade and financial openness while growth was primarily stimulated by trade 
alone and only in the short run, but is harmed by trade in the long run. The significance of the 
constant terms supports the assumption made earlier that there is a difference across countries, 
which accounts for country specific characteristics that influence the long run relationship between 
the deviation from the pre-crisis paths of both growth and output and the levels of openness. I can 
find evidence of the dual role of trade openness in the table above which puts the differing results 
in the literature into perspective, but more on this later. To provide a basis for comparison across 
the two datasets: annual and quarterly, the countries common to both datasets are obtained and 
regressions using the respective estimation procedure is carried out for both reduced datasets. The 
results of these regressions are shown in Table 7 below. The same pattern is observed in both these 
datasets suggesting a uniformity in the findings. 
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Table 7: Comparison across Annual and Quarterly datasets 
 Annual Quarterly 
 DLEVEL DGROWTH DLEVEL DGROWTH 
TO -0.17*** 0.01*** -0.54*** 0.07*** 
FO 0.02 -0.017*** -0.001 -0.0013* 
TFE yes yes yes yes 
Countries 23 23 23 23 
 
1.3.3 Robustness Checks 
Taking a cue from previous works that have studied the differences in impact of financial crises 
across different countries, tables 8-13 establish the robustness of my results by introducing the 
following variables known to have influenced the degree of the impact of financial crises. 
 1.3.3.1 Bank Lending rates: I expect that the lower the lending rates during a crisis, the 
more loans can be granted and ultimately, the higher the levels of both output and growth which 
implies lower Dlevel and DGrowth measures. This suggests that a positive coefficient is expected 
when lending rates are introduced to the analysis. Tables 8 - 11 show a consistently positive and 
strongly significant coefficient verifying my assumption. I find that trade openness is robust to the 
inclusion of this measure for both output and growth. I also find that the de-jure measure of 
financial openness is robust when considering output levels and consistently insignificant when 
considering growth, while the de-facto measure is robust for growth but not robust for output15. 
1.3.3.2 Net Reserves: Berkmen et. al (2009) find evidence that the higher the international 
reserves an economy possesses, the smaller the effect of the financial crisis. I would therefore 
expect that countries with higher net reserves would be affected less, which would suggest a 
                                                          
15 The reduction in the number of countries for the quarterly dataset due to data availability rendered estimation 
impossible, so results for bank lending rates are only presented for the annual dataset.  
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negative coefficient for both output and growth. I find that for the group of countries studied in the 
annual dataset, this measure is only significant for growth rate measures using the de-facto measure 
of financial openness, but I find a different sign than what was expected suggesting a harmful role 
for the accumulation of reserves in the economy. Perhaps this is a reflection of economies that 
were too cautious and saved too much at the expense of growth. Measures of openness are however 
robust to the inclusion of the net reserves variable in this dataset. The quarterly dataset while 
having the expected sign is not significant for both output and growth. In addition, I find that the 
de-facto measure of financial openness is not robust to its inclusion, while the trade measure is.   
1.3.3.3 Current Account Balance: Berkmen et. al (2009) also find evidence that lower current 
account deficits are associated with a lower impact of financial crisis and as such, I expect that the 
higher the current account balance (more positive), the lower the effect of the financial crisis 
suggesting a negative coefficient. I find in the annual dataset that while the expected sign was 
obtained, the coefficients were always insignificant and the trade and financial openness measures 
were robust to its inclusion. The quarterly dataset however shows a strong significance with the 
expected negative sign, confirming my hypothesis with only the trade openness measure being 
robust to its inclusion. 
1.3.3.4 Domestic Financial development: I use the ratio of domestic credit to GDP for both the 
financial sector and the private sector as a proxy for this variable16. The assumption is that the 
more developed an economy’s financial system, the higher the credit made available for sectors 
that need it. This would imply a lower reliance on international financial transactions thereby 
limiting the effects of the financial crisis. As a result, I expect that the higher the levels of domestic 
                                                          
16 Quarterly Data on domestic credit to the financial sector could not be obtained, so only the estimates from the 
domestic credit to the private sector are reported  
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credit, the lower the impact of the crisis, suggesting a negative coefficient for both proxies. For 
the annual dataset, I find the expected sign and statistical significance with respect of output levels 
but no significance with respect to growth. I also find that both measures of openness are robust 
to the inclusion of this variable. For the quarterly dataset, I estimate a significant coefficient with 
a different than expected sign with respect to output and an insignificant coefficient with the 
expected sign with respect to growth, but both openness measures are robust to the inclusion of 
this variable.  
1.3.3.5 Exchange rates: I use the real and nominal effective exchange rates for this measure in 
order to de-emphasize any advantage in exchange rates not originating from the country of interest. 
This feature is inherently built in to this measure due to the fact that this variable measures a 
currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies. Unlike the standard bilateral 
exchange rate, an increase in the nominal or real effective exchange rate implies an appreciation 
of the local currency17. The overall effect of an increase in the exchange rate is difficult to pin 
down as it is due to the characteristics of the economy (export oriented or import reliant) as well 
as the price and quantity effect. In my annual dataset, I find that only nominal effective exchange 
rate is statistically significant with respect to output while both nominal and real effective 
exchange rates are statistically significant with respect to growth. All these coefficients carry a 
positive sign suggesting that an appreciation of an economy’s currency increases the impact of the 
financial crisis. Also, trade openness is robust to the inclusion of these variables while financial 
openness is ambiguous18. In the quarterly dataset, I find consistently negative coefficients with 
only the nominal effective exchange rate’s effect on output levels being statistically significant. 
                                                          
17 The real effective exchange rate is the nominal divided by the price deflator 
18 See tables 8-11 
31 
 
Trade openness is once again robust to inclusion of these variables while financial openness is not 
robust with respect to output and remains insignificant with respect to growth. 
1.3.4 Accounting for the impact of openness on the speed of convergence 
Next, I examine the effect of openness (both through trade and finance) on the speed of 
convergence of each country to its pre-crisis paths of output and growth. To do this, I disaggregate 
the quarterly panel dataset into individual time series for each country, and estimate the 
parameter (speed of convergence) for each country. I therefore estimate 
 1 1 0 1 2 11 21 1j j j j j j j j j j j j jt t t t t t tDLevel DLevel TO FO TO FO                 (14) 
 2 1 0 1 2 11 21 2j j j j j j j j j j j jt t t t t t tDGrowth DGrowth TO FO TO FO                    (15) 
Where j is the index for each country in the sample, and other symbols are defined as above. Figure 
11 below shows a chart of the different rates of speed at which each country converges to its pre-
crisis paths for both growth and output. It is clear, as one would expect, that countries converge to 
the pre-crisis path of growth much faster than that of output. The absolute values of the estimated 
1 2 and 
j j  19are plotted with the average measure of openness across the post crisis time periods 
observed for each country. To determine the relationship beetween the speed of convergence and 
the level of openness, I estimate the following two equations; 
 
                                                          
19 Only the estimates which were negative, signifying convergence were included in the graphs. The positive values 
were omitted from the plots as the positive slopes could imply that the country’s post crisis path has been 
permanently altered and the new path never converges to the old path, i.e. a permanent change in the trend of the 
GDP. There were no positive estimates for the growth rate suggesting a return to pre-crisis path of growth for all 
economies studied.    
 
 
Table 8: Annual Dataset Robustness checks – DLEVEL/De-facto financial openness measure 
Variable DLEVEL  
Trade openness -0.127*** -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.128*** -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.13*** 
Financial openness_De-facto 
measure 
0.02*** 0.007 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.03*** 0.007 -0.016 
Bank lending rates  0.007***       0.002 
Net Reserves   -0.059      0.10 
Current Account Balance    -0.03     -0.001 
% domestic credit to Banks     -0.001***     
% domestic credit to Private 
sector 
     -0.0001***   -0.002* 
Real effective exchange rates       -0.0001   
Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
       0.001** 0.001 
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of countries 50 37 50 50 49 49 37 38 26 
 
Table 9: Annual Dataset Robustness checks – DLEVEL/De-jure financial openness measure 
Variable DLEVEL  
Trade openness -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.14*** 
Financial openness_De-
jure measure 
-0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.07** -0.07* -0.07** -0.045 -0.056 -0.08* 
Bank lending rates  0.006***       0.002 
Net Reserves   -0.019      0.009 
Current Account Balance    -0.02     -0.01 
% domestic credit to 
Banks 
    -0.0006**     
% domestic credit to 
Private sector 
     -0.0009***   -0.002* 
Real effective exchange 
rates 
      0.0004   
Nominal effective 
exchange rate 
       0.001*** 0.002 
Time fixed effects yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of countries 50 37 50 50 49 49 37 38 26 
3
2
 
33 
 
Table 10: Annual Dataset Robustness checks – DGROWTH/De-facto financial openness measure 
Variable DGROWTH  
Trade openness -0.09** -0.21*** -0.07** -0.10** -0.12 -0.1 -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.18 
Financial openness_De-facto 
measure 
-0.04*** -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.05** -0.04** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.06*** 
Bank lending rates  0.007***       0.006* 
Net Reserves   0.2**      0.05 
Current Account Balance    -0.08     0.04 
% domestic credit to Banks     -0.0005     
% domestic credit to 
Private sector 
     0.0007   -0.001 
Real effective exchange rate       0.004***   
Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
       0.004*** 0.004** 
Time fixed effects YES yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of countries 50 36 50 50 49 49 37 38 25 
 
Table 11: Annual Dataset Robustness checks – DGROWTH/De-jure financial openness measure 
Variable DGROWTH  
Trade openness -0.1** -0.2*** -0.1** -0.1** -0.1 -0.08 -0.14** -0.2*** -0.12 
Financial openness_De-jure 
measure 
0.07 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.11 
Bank lending rates  0.008***       0.01** 
Net Reserves   0.12      0.07 
Current Account Balance    -0.07     -0.14 
% domestic credit to Banks     -0.0004     
% domestic credit to Private 
sector 
     0.0008   0.00002 
Real effective exchange rate       0.005***   
Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
       0.004*** 0.003* 
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of countries 50 36 50 50 49 49 37 38 25 
 
3
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Table 12: Quarterly Dataset Robustness checks – DLEVEL 
Variable DLEVEL  
Financial openness (long run) -0.0004*** 0.004 0.0008 -0.01*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.0006 
Trade openness (long run) 0.141 -0.67*** -0.612*** -0.59*** -0.634*** -0.60*** -0.677*** 
Error Correction parameter -0.09*** -0.147*** -0.143*** -0.166*** -0.138*** -0.140*** -0.17*** 
Net Reserves  -0.019     -0.037*** 
Current Account Balance   -0.396***    -0.673*** 
% domestic credit to private sector    0.059***   0.043*** 
Real effective exchange rates     -0.0005   
Nominal effective exchange rate      -0.001*** -0.002*** 
Financial openness (short run) -0.008 -0.014 -0.013 -0.022 0.002 0.003 -0.002 
Trade openness (short run) -0.47*** -0.39*** -0.395*** -0.443*** -0.304*** -0.299*** -0.31*** 
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of countries 30 30 30 24 26 26 23 
 
Table 13: Quarterly Dataset Robustness checks – DGROWTH 
Variable DGROWTH  
Financial openness (long run) -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 
Trade openness (long run) 0.05** 0.05** 0.04** 0.06** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05 
Error Correction parameter -0.813*** -0.814*** -0.812*** -0.774*** -0.792*** -0.793*** -0.734*** 
Net Reserves  -0.003     0.0001 
Current Account Balance   -0.168***    -0.176*** 
% domestic credit to private sector    -0.0006   0.006* 
Real effective exchange rates     -0.00002   
Nominal effective exchange rate      -0.00002 -0.0002** 
Financial openness (short run) -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.02 0.004 0.004 -0.002 
Trade openness (short run) -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.492*** -0.55*** -0.392*** -0.391*** -0.41*** 
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of countries 30 30 30 24 26 26 21 
3
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1 1 2i i i ispeedl c ATO AFO              (16) 
2 3 4i i i ispeedg c ATO AFO              (17) 
Where  
ispeedl is the magnitude of the speed of convergence to pre-crisis path of GDP for country i  
ispeedg  is the magnitude of the speed of convergence to pre-crisis path of growth for country i  
iATO is the average measure of trade openness in the sample period examined for country i  
iAFO  is the average measure of financial openness in the sample period examined for country i  
Figure 11: Speed of convergence to Pre-Crisis paths of GDP and Growth           
   
Table 14 below shows the results of the estimates of equations 16 and 17. The results from the 
table 14 below show that there is no statistically significant relationship between the level of 
openness and the speed of convergence to the pre-crisis paths of output and growth. This suggests 
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that country specific factors or other aggregate measures not captured here are responsible for 
determining the speed of convergence and not openness. 
Table 14: Results showing the relationship between openness and speed of convergence 
Dependent 
Variable 
speedl  speedg  
 1 2 3 1 2 3 
       
ATO  0.075  0.203 -0.358  -0.358 
AFO   -0.009 -0.0112  -0.000002 -0.000002 
*,**, and *** signify significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
1, 2 and 3 are different regressions run with ATO alone, AFO alone and ATO and AFO together respectively 
Estimating equations 16 and 17 using Ordinary least squares estimation procedure 
Where ATO is the average trade openness and AFO is the average financial openness of each country in the post crisis 
time period studied (2008 – 2013) 
 
1.3.5 Accounting for the impact of openness over time 
Finally, I observe the relationship between the impact of the crisis and openness over time. I once 
again disaggregate the quarterly panel datasets into individual time series and estimate regression 
equations for each country in the sample. These regressions are similar to previous regressions 
run, with the added assumption that the estimated coefficients vary over time. This provides a 
better understanding of the relationship between the impact of a crisis and openness measures over 
time by providing a more accurate picture of the response of each country’s economy to the 
financial crisis determining whether or not the role of openness is indeed asymmetric, ergo, I 
estimate the following regression equations and use the state space model with the Kalman filter 
approach to estimate the time varying parameters.: 
0 1 1 2 1 1
j j j j j j j
t t t t t t tDLevel TO FO              18 
0 3 1 4 1 2'
j j j j j j j
t t t t t t tDgrowth TO FO              19 
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Where j is the index for each country in the sample with other symbols defined as above. In this 
paper, I assume that coefficients follow a random walk over time. This is because I assume that 
countries would base future decisions of level of openness on the impact of the previous level of 
openness.  As such, the coefficients evolve according to the following equation: 
1 ,it it i tv     for i  = 1,2,3 and 4         20 
Where i  is the index for each coefficient in equations 18 and 19, and 
,i tv is the shock to each 
coefficient.  
The results of these estimates from the GAUSS statistical package are plotted for output and 
growth for each country in the appendix. From the graphs, it is clear to see first and foremost that 
countries are more responsive to trade openness than they are to financial openness, as suggested 
in the panel regressions above. Secondly, almost all countries experience a sharp increase in the 
relationship between trade openness and DLEVEL within the first few quarters, indicating the 
period of contraction of the crisis, showing the role of trade openness as a vector. However, the 
decline in the responsiveness to trade openness seems to suggest that, while trade openness still 
continued to increase the deviation from the predicted path, it did so at a decreasing rate, and in 
some cases, eventually reverted to a negative relationship suggesting a decline in the deviation. 
Third, it is also evident that financial openness does not contribute to the deviation as much as 
trade openness, and in some cases, helps to retard the magnitude of deviation from the predicted 
path, confirming trade openness’ role as the major vector of propagation. The variation in effects 
of financial openness across countries might be due to the de-facto measure used, which does not 
capture different countries’ attitude towards inflow of capital.  The same initial spike in the 
relationship between the impact and trade openness is also observed with respect to growth, with 
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some countries also showing that downward trend suggesting positive benefits to becoming more 
open via trade after the contraction of a crisis, indicating its role as a cure.  
1.4 Conclusion 
In this paper, I set out to determine the role of openness in an economy during a crisis. Using two 
datasets: annual and quarterly, I examine different aspects of the relationship between openness 
and the impact of a crisis including: “distance”, “speed”, and “time”. Distance is defined as the 
deviation from the pre-crisis paths of output and growth, speed is defined as the rate of return to 
the pre-crisis paths, and time deals with the relationship between the impact of a crisis and 
openness as time progresses. Taking the financial crisis of 2008 as a case study, my main result 
suggests that both trade and financial openness have different effects on the impact of the crisis 
depending on the length of time studied, i.e. short or long run. I also find a dual role for both types 
of openness acting as both a vector that negatively impacts the economy during a crisis and as a 
cure that also helps return the economy to its pre-crisis paths. 
One major source of discrepancy in the literature addressed in this study is the variation in results 
obtained from utilizing different measures of financial openness20, and as with other studies, I find 
that discrepancy here as well. The explanation might be the fact that the de-jure measure offers 
insight about an economy’s tolerance for foreign participation in its domestic markets and makes 
no claim to its attitude towards local participation in foreign markets as the de-facto measure does. 
The consequence being, economies that rank higher on the de-jure measure, classified as more 
financially open, make it more palatable for foreigners to invest in their economy, especially 
during times of crisis. This in turn serves as a boost that increases the economy’s performance, 
                                                          
20 de-jure vs de-facto measures of financial openness 
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indicating a positive contribution of financial openness.  The de-facto measure does not 
differentiate between foreign participation in local markets and local participation in foreign 
markets and as such, might capture an outflow of resources from an economy (more financially 
open), yielding a negative contribution of financial openness. 
In examining the speed of recovery, I find that countries converge faster to their pre-crisis path of 
growth rates than they do to their pre-crisis path of output, giving more weight to the initial 
assumption in this paper, that a return to pre-crisis levels of growth does not imply a return to 
normalcy. I also find no evidence of a relationship between the speed of convergence and the level 
of openness. While preliminary evidence points to the possibility that countries that are more open 
via trade converge faster to their pre-crisis paths of output but slower to their pre-crisis level of 
growth, and that countries that are more financially open converge slower to pre-crisis paths of 
both output and growth, these relationships are however proven to be statistically unsubstantiated. 
I also disaggregate the panel structure to obtain individual time series for each country, and using 
a time varying parameter approach, allow the coefficients of trade openness and financial openness 
to vary over time21. This is perhaps the most convincing evidence of the dual roles of both types 
of openness during the financial crisis, as both the vector through which the contagion spreads and 
a tool through which the impact is lessened over time.  
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Results in appendix 1.2 
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Appendix 1.1 
Table A.1 below is a list of all countries in the two main datasets used in this paper 
Full Annual dataset 
 Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium,  Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cabo 
Verde, Chile, Hong Kong, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia,  Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, 
Malta, Moldova, Namibia, Netherland, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, 
Romania, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, United States, Zambia. 
Full Quarterly Dataset 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden , Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States  
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Table A.2 below outlines the variables used in this study, as well as the sources of the data 
Variable Description Source 
Annual Quarterly 
GDP level Gross domestic product of the 
country, every quarter or every year 
World Bank development 
Indicator  
OECD stats 
Growth 
rate 
First difference of GDP level 
measures for both quarterly and 
annual data 
World Bank development 
Indicator 
OECD stats 
Trade 
openness 
Summation of total exports and total 
imports as a fraction of GDP  
World Bank development 
Indicator 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
Financial 
openness: 
De-facto 
measure 
Summation of country’s 
international investment positions 
(Assets and Liabilities) as a fraction 
of GDP 
International Financial 
Statistics 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
Financial 
Openness: 
De-jure 
measure 
Chinn-Ito measure of financial 
openness.  
http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-
Ito_website.htm 
N/A 
Lending 
rates 
Bank Lending rates International Financial 
Statistics  
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
Net 
Reserves 
Net Reserves (With Fund record) IMF Balance of Payments 
database 
IMF Balance of 
Payments 
database 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
Balance from Current and Capital 
account 
IMF Balance of Payments 
database 
IMF Balance of 
Payments 
database 
Domestic 
Credit to 
Financial 
Sector 
Domestic credit to financial 
institutions as a fraction of GDP 
World Bank development 
Indicator 
N/A 
Domestic 
Credit to 
Private 
sector 
Domestic credit to non-financial 
institutions as a fraction of GDP 
World Bank development 
Indicator 
Bank of 
International 
Settlements  
Real 
Effective 
exchange 
rate 
Real effective exchange rates index 
(2010 Base year) 
International Financial 
Statistics 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
Nominal 
Effective 
Exchange 
rate 
Nominal Effective exchange rates 
(2010 Base year) 
International Financial 
Statistics 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
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Table A.3 below shows the selected AR approximations of the different datasets 
Dataset Process SIC value Rejected coefficients 
(95% C.I) 
Annual  AR(0)  0.883996 - 
 AR(1) -3.070718 - 
 AR(2)** -3.267185* - 
 AR(3) -3.256608 AR(3) 
 AR(4) -3.228025 AR(3), AR(4) 
    
Quarterly  AR(0)  -1.149958 - 
 AR(1)** -6.058698* - 
 AR(2) -6.043402 AR(2) 
 AR(3) -6.039677 - 
 AR(4) -6.031011 AR(3), AR(4) 
    
*signifies the smallest SIC value, **signifies the chosen AR process 
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Appendix 1.2 
The following graphs depict the evolution of the response of the level of deviation from an 
economy’s pre crisis GDP and growth paths to changes in their level of openness in the post-crisis 
periods for all 30 countries in the quarterly data sample studied.   
               Figures 1 & 2: Australia                                             Figures 3 & 4: Austria 
             Level                         Growth                               Level             Growth 
                       
              
  Figures 5 & 6: Belgium                                               Figures 7 & 8: Brazil 
             Level                         Growth                               Level             Growth 
                           
 
                 Figures 9 & 10: Canada                                            Figures 11 & 12: Chile 
            Level                         Growth                               Level             Growth 
                           
 
         Figures 13 & 14: Czech Republic                                   Figures 15 & 16: Denmark 
            Level                         Growth                               Level             Growth 
                              
              
 Figures 17 & 18: Estonia                                           Figures 19 & 20: Finland 
           Level                         Growth                               Level             Growth 
                             
Figures 21 & 22: Germany                                       Figures 23 & 24: Greece 
           Level                         Growth                               Level             Growth 
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    Figures 25 & 26: Hungary                                      Figures 27 & 28: Iceland 
           Level                         Growth                               Level             Growth 
                            
 
                  Figures 29 & 30: India    Figures 31 & 32: Israel 
            Level                           Growth                               Level             Growth 
                            
 
                   Figures 33 & 34: Italy                                          Figures 35 & 36: Korea 
            Level                         Growth                                Level             Growth 
                            
            
Figures 37 & 38: Luxembourg                                  Figures 39 & 40: Netherlands 
            Level                         Growth                                Level             Growth 
                            
 
           Figures 41 & 42: New Zealand                                  Figures 43 & 44: Poland     
      Level                         Growth                                Level             Growth 
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Figures 45 & 46: Portugal                                 Figures 47 & 48: Slovak Republic 
            Level                         Growth                                Level             Growth 
                            
 
                 Figures 49 & 50: Spain               Figures 51 & 52: Sweden 
            Level                         Growth                                Level             Growth 
                           
 
              Figures 53 & 54: Switzerland                                    Figures 55 & 56: Turkey 
            Level                         Growth                                Level             Growth 
                            
           
Figures 57 & 58: United Kingdom                           Figures 59 & 60: United States 
            Level                         Growth                                Level             Growth 
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Chapter 2 
The Role of Risk in Bilateral Trade 
2.1 Introduction 
As is well known, distance in the discourse of international trade and gravity models is a proxy for 
transportation costs, as illustrated by the familiar iceberg shipping cost principle: if an iceberg is 
sailed across the ocean from a given origin point to a given destination point, the melted ice lost 
along the way is viewed as transport cost, hence the association between distance and cost. Let us 
now add to this familiar principle, the varying weather conditions between the origin and 
destination. The amount of ice arriving at the destination would then undoubtedly vary even though 
the distance remains the same. The unpredictable nature of the weather in this case produces a new 
dimension in the size of ice reaching the destination, that of uncertainty. Such uncertainty gives 
rise to perceived risk, therefore accounting for the role of risk in trade flow determination is 
potentially as relevant as the role of distance.  Risk here is generally defined as the uncertainty 
associated with any potential event that could result in an alteration of a previously agreed upon volume of 
exports (or imports). Specifically, I use the World Governance Indicator measure of political instability and 
the presence of terrorist activities proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) as a proxy for risk. This measure is 
an aggregate of household perceptions from surveys about Government stability as well as measures of 
internal and external conflicts and ethnic tensions. It also encompasses statistics including frequencies of 
political killings, disappearances and tortures. All of which make this an ideal measure to capture 
perceptions about the risk rating of a country in order to determine if these perceptions influence trading 
decisions. 
Several theories have been developed over the course of time that attempt to explain the existence 
of bilateral trade. These theories range from the Ricardian theory, which proposes that trade is 
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generated by differences in cross country technological endowments22, to the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson theory, which suggests that trade is a result of differences in country factor 
endowments, to Paul Krugman’s theory that trade is a result of consumers’ preferences for variety 
and economies of scale in production. While these theories and their numerous derivatives or 
extensions have been validated at some point or another, they mainly determine which goods are 
traded and the reasons why these goods emerge as import or export goods in each country. But 
once a country determines its export capabilities and its import needs based on its level of 
technology, factor endowments or consumer preferences, the final decision of which country with 
whom to engage in trade still remains. These theories, however, do not extend to a country’s choice 
in trading partners as the theoretical assumptions restrict the number of available trading partners 
such that, when a country decides to trade, there is only one available option. In reality though, 
this is not the case. There are many potential trading partners and these models do not provide any 
insight on how a country chooses its trading partner from the available choices; it is this missing 
link in trade theory that has given rise to the gravity equation. 
The gravity equation is a very successful empirical finding that shows that the value of bilateral 
trade between countries is positively correlated with the sizes of their economies (GDP) and is 
negatively correlated with the distance between them. Essentially, a country chooses its trading 
partners based on similar production capacities and the distance between them. While one of the 
earliest criticisms of the gravity model after its inception by Tinbergen (1962) was its lack of 
theoretical foundations, recent research has incorporated the basic theoretical foundations in 
international trade into the gravity model. These studies have eliminated the initial concern and 
                                                          
22 This leads to comparative advantage in the production of a particular good, which in turn leads to specialization 
and exportation of that good. 
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have led to a wider acceptance of this empirical finding (Anderson, 2011). For example, Evenett 
and Keller (1998) investigate possible theoretical validations of the gravity equation by examining 
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory and the theory of increasing returns to verify whether 
either theory has significant explanatory power to account for the success of the gravity model. 
They find that both models explain various components of the differences in trade volumes 
between countries and that these various components have implications for productivity growth 
and labor. Their findings support the gravity equation’s proposed relationship between trade and 
GDP, but shed no light on the trade - distance relationship.  
Feenstra and Markusen (2001) also try to reconcile the existing theoretical models of international 
trade with the empirical success of the gravity equation. They argue that different theories in 
international trade predict differences in key parameter values generated by the gravity model. 
These differences arise if goods are either differentiated or homogenous across trading partners 
and whether or not there is a barrier to trade (high tariffs or sanctions).  
A survey of the literature on the gravity equation shows just how successful this empirical model 
has been in describing trade flows. Studies such as the one carried out by Baier and Bergstrand 
(2001) provide some insight into the reasons for increased international trade, using the gravity 
model as their empirical tool. They investigate the relevance of a reduction in transportation costs, 
multilateral and bilateral trade liberalization, income growth and convergence in growth to changes 
in trade flows. Using data from OECD countries between the 1950s and the 1980s, they find that 
income growth accounts for about 67% of the increase in international trade, with 25% being 
explained by liberalization (reduction in trade tariffs), and about 8% due to decline in 
transportation costs. They find that convergence in growth has little to no effect on the increase in 
trade. This suggests that the gravity equation provides an explanation for at most 75% of the 
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increase in international trade. Crucially, however, this does not shed any light on the pre-existing 
trade flows between any given pair trading partners. 
Subsequently, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) tested the effects of country pair variables that 
encourage the formation of Free Trade agreements. They consider distance between the trading 
partners, remoteness of trading partners compared to the rest of the world, similarities in 
production (GDP), the size of the trading partners compared to the size of other countries, and 
relative factor endowments. They find that these factors accurately predict 85% of the 286 Free 
trade agreements in place as at 1996 and 97% of the other countries who do not have free trade 
agreements. While these results indicate the success of gravity model, and in particular the role of 
distance, in forming free trade agreements, they do not shed any further light on the accuracy of 
the gravity models in predicting actual trade flows. 
Chaney (2011) in his attempt to explain the success of the gravity model establishes a theory to 
explain the validity of the trade-distance relationship proposed by the gravity model. He asserts 
that firms can only export (or import) from markets to which they have access. He suggests that 
these firms acquire more access based on the connections that they had previously acquired, and 
distance initially is a hindrance to access of these markets and as such, bilateral trade is inversely 
proportional to the distance between trading partners. This finding of “path-dependence” of trade 
based on initial distance highlights perhaps a major reason why distance continues to be a major 
determinant of trade flows, even as transportation costs have decreased significantly over time and 
trade has liberalized immensely.  
Kimura and Lee (2006) extend the success of the gravity model to include trade in services as well 
as goods. They assess the impact of various factors on bilateral trade in services as opposed to 
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trade in goods with data from 10 OECD countries in 1999 and 2000. They find that the gravity 
model fits the data for bilateral trade in services even better than that of bilateral trade in goods. 
They also find that there is a positive correlation between goods exports and imports of services. 
This implies that data on trade flows can encompass both goods and services when running gravity 
model equations.  
Despite the success of the gravity model, a few limitations have emerged in several recent studies. 
A description of these limitations highlight the reasons why this study is relevant to the literature 
on gravity models of trade. Thus, an exposition of these limitations is followed by that of my own 
contribution. Helpman et. al. (2007) who focus on firm heterogeneity and differences in the 
number of exporting firms across countries, decompose total trade value into trade per exporting 
firm and the number of exporting firms. They discover a bias of the traditional estimates based on 
the gravity model, primarily due to the fact that the number of exporting firms in each country is 
not separately accounted for and in effect is inherently assumed not to vary. Essentially, the fact 
that the number and type of firms differ across countries might in itself, be the very reason for 
trade between these countries, a fact that is not explicitly captured in the gravity equation. 
In the same vein as Helpman et. al., Rose and Spiegel (2002) argue that there is a relationship 
between international trade and Country lending choices suggesting yet another factor that might 
influence trade flows between countries. They show theoretically that countries do not default on 
their debts to avoid sanctions that will diminish international trade, and as such, suggest that 
creditors should lend to countries that have close ties via trade. As a result of this, it is clear that 
there are other cross country relationships that could influence the choice in trading partners or 
amount of trade between country pairs not captured in the standard gravity model. Furthermore, a 
country’s commitment to debt repayment sends a signal of credibility to a potential trading partner 
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and as such, could bias countries to engage in trade. This finding highlights a potential measure of 
a country’s risk measure. Countries that default on their debt payments could potentially be viewed 
as high risk trading partners for the exact same reasons they are not able to make their debt 
payments (low productivity, negative shocks, unsustainable debts, etc.) 
Paramount among all the recent critiques of the gravity model is the finding by Brun et. al. (2003), 
as this study casts doubt on the distance-trade relationship, which is central to the gravity equation. 
They show that the efficiency of the distance measure in predicting trade flows has decreased with 
the passage of time. Using a time varying parameter approach on 130 countries between 1962 and 
1996, they measure the impact of distance as a determinant of bilateral trade over time. They 
initially discover that the elasticity of the absolute value of bilateral trade with respect to distance 
increases over the years. They attribute this to a decline in transportation costs not related to 
distance such as handling fees, but an increase in distance related costs such as oil prices. They 
then find that if an “augmented23” barrier-to-trade function is introduced, there is an 11% decline 
in the elasticity in the same set of countries over the 30 year period investigated. They also note 
that this decline is prominent in trade between developed countries. This finding gives support to 
the idea that with increasing technology, transportation costs decline which minimizes the 
importance of distance as a predictor for bilateral trade creating room for the introduction of a new 
determinant of bilateral trade. 
It is these critiques, especially the last, that pave the way for my contribution. In particular, the 
critiques imply that the gravity equation in its present formulation, and particularly the role of 
distance may be losing its explanatory power of global trade flows due to factors ranging from 
                                                          
23 They augment the standard specification of the gravity model by introducing an index for quality of infrastructure, 
the cost of oil and a proxy for freight costs between primary products and manufactures to the transport cost function 
that is the basis of distance-trade relationship in the gravity equation.  
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globalization, to technological advances, and reduced transportation costs. These factors have 
allowed countries to begin to overcome the initial distance barrier that once hampered trade.  
Thus, new determinants of trade flows must be sought and new variables investigated and 
incorporated in the standard gravity model. This is where my contribution lies. I suggest a “risk-
augmented” approach to the original iceberg shipping cost model that led to the inclusion of 
distance, as summarized earlier. So far, the literature has considered two major sources of risk that 
can influence trade; wars and exchange rate fluctuations. These two variables can impact trade 
flows through the degree of risk that they impose on both the supply (Exports) side and demand 
(Imports) side: wars through uncertainty due to supply shocks or export disruptions and currency 
fluctuations through importer uncertainty and difficult contract negotiations. 
There have been several studies carried out on the effects of wars on trade flows. For the most part, 
economists have suggested a negative correlation between trade and wars. Most recently, Karam 
and Zaki (2015) introduce a dummy variable to the standard gravity model which indicates the 
presence of war, in order to determine what effect wars have on trade flows in countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa. They find that the presence of wars in these regions have a 
significantly negative impact on trade flows. They also find that this negative impact is on 
manufactured goods and wars have little to no effect on the trade in services. This finding is a 
corroboration of the work by Bayer and Rupert (2004), who find that civil wars not only negatively 
impact trade in afflicted countries, but in partners who take sides in these conflicts. There are 
however, other findings that seem to suggest a positive impact of war on trade flows. Gholz and 
Press (2001), suggest that the effects of wars might be over exaggerated particularly when looking 
at the impact of wars on Neutral countries. The argument for a negative impact of wars on neutral 
states is the loss of trade partnerships with countries now devoting their resources to fighting these 
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wars. They suggest that this loss is only just a decline in the efficiency from moving from the old 
best choice to a new best choice, and that these neutral countries as a result of the war can benefit 
by exporting goods to the warring countries, and expanding export activities to markets previously 
dominated by the warring states.  
The dual nature of the effects of wars on trade is not the biggest issue with this as a proxy measure 
for risk in determining trade. Apart from the fact that war is a realization of an extreme that is only 
present in a few countries and only at certain times, and as such does not account for trade flows 
for a majority of countries for a significant amount of time, there is also the potential for reverse 
causality between war and trade.  Jackson and Nei (2015) theoretically show that trade agreements 
decrease the likelihood of interstate wars and thus, trade has a stabilizing effect in regions. They 
also attribute the decline in conflicts post 1950, to trade agreements and show that this is also 
consistent with their model.  
The second way in which risk has been introduced in the literature as a determinant of bilateral 
trade is through currency fluctuations. There is a consensus that currency fluctuations can impact 
trade flows either through the exchange rate volatility or currency misalignment. Auboin and Ruta 
(2012) suggest that the mechanism through which exchange rates impact trade is the level of 
uncertainty that it instills in traders, while currency misalignments; which is a deviation from the 
equilibrium exchange rate, can lead to inefficient allocation of resources between tradable and 
non-tradable goods which ultimately has an impact on export growth. Eichengreen and Irwin 
(1995) study the impact of commercial and financial policies on trade in the 1930s. They find that 
commercial policies weakened the relationship between income and trade and that exchange rate 
volatility negatively impacted trade. This finding was also supported by Tenreyro and Barro (2003) 
who find that common currencies increase trade between partner countries. Broll and Eckwert 
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(1999) however, theoretically postulate a situation through which exchange rate volatility could 
have a positive impact on trade flows, but only in firms that have access to wide local markets and 
can adapt quickly to these short term fluctuations in order to capitalize on them. Baron (1976) 
suggests that the effects of exchange rate volatility on trade can be minimized by exchange rate 
hedging, but Auboin and Ruta (2012) counter that argument by suggesting that the increased cost 
of exchange rate hedging, will lead to more expensive imports, and will still have a negative impact 
on trade. Auboin and Ruta (2012) also state that there is mixed empirical evidence of the effects 
of exchange rate volatility on trade in the literature, a view also supported by Bearce and Fisher 
(2002). They observe that the effect of volatility on trade is small and not robust. This conclusion 
is strengthened by Broda and Romalis (2003) who show the existence of reverse causality between 
trade and exchange rates and state that accounting for this reverse causality reduces the impact of 
exchange rate volatility on trade. They find evidence that exchange rate volatility affects trade in 
differentiated products, but has no effect on where a commodity gets sold and that trade in all 
products affects the exchange rate volatility. These two results not only show the reverse causality 
between trade and exchange rate volatility, but also serve to identify a way to resolve this issue. 
They posit that since commodity trade is only affected by the price levels and not by volatility, the 
one-way effect of volatility on trade is only on differentiated products. They find that adjusting for 
this reduces the estimated effect of currency unions on trade from 300% to between 10 and 25%. 
Furthermore, Nicita (2013) looking at trade flows in 100 countries between 2000 and 2009 find 
that currency misalignment is more important than exchange rate volatility when looking at the 
impact on trade.  
In general, when considering uncertainty (risk) as a determinant of trade, there is a potential for 
reverse causality between risk and trade flow. Certain types of country idiosyncratic risks could 
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be the reason why countries engage in trade in the first place. Kanniainen and Mustonen (2010) 
study international trade agreements from a risk management perspective. They suggest that 
countries engage in trade agreements to compensate for unforeseen negative shocks to 
productivity, in essence, countries mitigate idiosyncratic (Country specific) risk by “insuring” 
against those negative shocks to production. Using bilateral trades in Finland, they conclude that 
international trade has provided more efficient risk management mainly through diversification. 
This finding seems to point to a reverse causality between bilateral trade and risk. On the one hand, 
trade is used to mitigate idiosyncratic risk, and on the other, risk is a driving force that might 
determine trade volume. It would be useful to distinguish between the different sources of risk, in 
order to determine which could influence trading decisions and which could be caused by trade so 
as to eliminate the reverse causality problem.  
Given the fact that previous measures of risk in bilateral trade flows have been subject to reverse 
causality and endogeneity, I propose an exogenous and more encompassing variable to measure 
risk and study its effects on bilateral trade: The level of political stability and the absence of 
terrorist attacks proposed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Massimo (2010). A higher ranking signifies a 
less risky trade partner, and a lower ranking signifies a riskier partner. This measure is perhaps the 
most exogenous measure of within country source of risk, as the variables captured within it as 
mentioned above, tend to be very unpredictable and as such, cannot be influenced by trade. It 
should be noted that this measure is more general and also encompasses the presence of wars in 
any region. A country such as Nigeria is not presently engaged in any official wars, but the 
presence of the terrorist group Boko Haram and the government’s efforts to eliminate this threat, 
presents a significant level of risk captured by this measure but not by that of the war indicator 
variable. Furthermore, countries currently at war are also captured by this variable when 
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considering the level of political instability in these regions.  To illustrate the potential of these 
perceptions of risk to influence trade flows, consider the following figures illustrating annual trade 
flows in India, Nigeria and the United States: 
Figure 12: Risk and Trade: Nigeria’s trade flows 
 
Figure 13a & b: Risk and Trade: India’s trade flows24 
             
 
 
                                                          
24 India is split into these two graphs in order to better illustrate the decline in trade pre 2000, as trade flows are 
much higher than they were in the 90s.  
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Figure 14: Risk and Trade: United States’ trade flows 
 
Ignoring the effects of diminished trade during the financial crisis, periods of unrest in these 
countries are often accompanied by a decline in either imports or exports. Figure 1 which shows 
the trade flows of Nigeria, depict slumps in trade during periods corresponding to the Jos Riots 
in 2001 and the increase in Boko Haram activities post 201025. Figures 2a and 2b which depict 
the trade flows for India, capture reductions in imports in 1984 and 1991 respectively 
corresponding to the assassinations of the Indian Prime Ministers of the time26, as well as in 
2013 following Militant attacks in Srinagar, Explosions in Hyderbad and riots in 
Muzaffarnagar27. Even a global power house like the United states is not exempt from this trend, 
as a noticeable decline in both imports and exports is observed post 2001 after the world trade 
center bombing. While these may be purely coincidental, it warrants a thorough investigation 
into the effect of the perceived risk (uncertainty) generated by these events on trade flows. 
                                                          
25 http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/27/world/africa/nigeria-year-of-attacks/ 
26 http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/21/newsid_2504000/2504739.stm 
27 http://www.mapsofindia.com/events/2013-major-events.html 
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In order to do this, an empirical model of the gravity equation featuring risk is estimated using data 
from 169 exporting countries trading with 178 partner countries between 2002 and 201328 to 
determine whether this assumption of a role for risk in bilateral trade can be generalized, Figure 5 
shows a scatter plot of the log of the average exports the countries in the dataset and the average 
of their risk rating in the time period studied. 
Figure 15: Export-Risk Rank Scatter plot 
 
There is an observable upward trend in the scatterplot indicating that the higher the risk ranking of 
the country (implying less risk), the higher the exports from that country. While this is not 
conclusive proof of the role of risk in trade, it suggests an inverse relationship between the level 
of risk and trade, which I verify empirically. 
Determining the reasons for a country’s choice in trading partners has several advantages, the first 
of which is a more accurate prediction of trade flows. The ability to better predict trade flows 
                                                          
28 yielding 30,241 partnerships over a 12-year period 
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between countries can potentially increase the accuracy in predicting GDP of which trade flows is 
a major component. It can also lead to more accurate trade policies instituted by policy makers in 
countries to either nurture burgeoning industries or provide needed goods and services to the 
consumers within their borders. Another benefit would be to gain insights into other reasons for 
the discrepancy in levels of development. It has been established that there are benefits from trade. 
These benefits are only realized as long as countries enter into a trading agreement and agree to 
provide each other with goods and services. This then begs the question; is specialization and 
subsequent production alone sufficient to attract countries to enter into a trading agreement with a 
particular country or are there other considerations that determine trading partnerships and flows? 
There is always the possibility that the goods being produced are scarce or indispensable, and as 
such, trading partners might overlook any other shortcomings to engage in trade. This is the best 
case scenario and is still subject to certain drawbacks. As a result of the relative value of the good 
in question, the exporting country could possibly suffer from a resource curse, or the debilitating 
effects of the “Dutch” disease phenomenon, both of which yield lower than optimal rates of 
growth. Figure 2 below shows the scatter plot of the average risk measures of the countries studied 
in this paper between 2002 and 2013 and their ranks according to their levels of development 
captured by the human development index measures in 2013.  
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Figure 1629: Risk rank – HDI rank scatter plot  
 
From this plot, the obvious downward trend suggests that the countries with a lower risk rank 
(riskier) are developing countries, and those with the higher risk rating (less risky) are developed 
countries. A possible conclusion that can be drawn from figures 1 and 2 could be that if the risk 
rating does in fact affect the level of trade flows between countries, and by extension, trade 
partnership choice, it becomes quite clear that developing countries will not be able to trade as 
much with their developed counterparts, possibly reducing the potential gains from exports  that 
could have otherwise bridged the gap between developed and developing countries, thus partially 
accounting for the continued discrepancy between them. 
The traditional gravity model suggests that the only way for a country to alter trade flows is to 
increase its level of production, since nothing can be done about its geographical distance from its 
trading partner. In reality though, increasing production does not necessarily translate into 
increased trade flows if there are fundamental issues causing potential trading partners to refuse 
                                                          
29 The United Nations Development Program classifies countries ranked between 1 and 49 as having a very high 
level of human development, 50 to 102 as having just a high level, 103 to 144 as having a medium level, and 145 to 
199 as having a low level of human development. 
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entry into trading agreements. The introduction of risk however, suggests that if policy makers 
address the sources of country specific risk that potential trading partners find off-putting, interest 
in trade will be generated increasing trade flows and ultimately, enhancing growth. The closest 
study to this was one carried out by deGroot et al, in 2004 (Henceforth called DEA). In their bid 
to test the effect of institutions on trade, they use an earlier version of the risk measure which I 
propose and determine that there is positive effect of both partners’ risk measure (which they 
interpret as a measure of institution) on trade flows30. This study differs significantly than the 
earlier version of DEA’s in the following ways. First, the measure used in this chapter has been 
improved and now encompasses 31 underlying sources as opposed to the 17 sources in the version 
used in the DEA 2004 paper, yielding more accurate measures (Kaufmann et al. 2010). Secondly, 
the DEA study is a cross sectional study for a hundred countries’ exports in 1998, while this chapter 
is a panel data set of 168 countries between 2002 and 2013. Perhaps, the most significant difference 
is captured by world attitude to risk post 1998. Consider figure 17 below which depicts the number 
of terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2013. There were relatively fewer number of attacks in 1998 
as compared to the time period studied in this chapter. Due to the drastic increase in terrorist 
activities, the effect of risk on trade flows is expected to be much more pronounced than is 
observed in DEA. Ultimately, the method of transmission from this measure to trade is 
fundamentally different, while DEA suggests that the actual occurrence of these factors affect the 
ability of a country’s firms to export, I suggest that the perception of risk due to the presence of 
these factors affects firm decisions with regard to trade volumes and partnership choice. 
                                                          
30 The findings in this study defer significantly as it pertains to the relationship between exports and partner country 
risk. See results in Table 15 below. 
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Figure 17: Number of terrorist incidents from 1970 to 201431 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows; section two provides some intuition behind the 
introduction of risk in bilateral trade as well as the empirical method and data used in this analysis. 
Section three discusses the results of the analysis and interpretations, while section four concludes. 
2.2 Intuition and Empirical approach 
The iceberg shipping cost assumption that relates greater distance to greater transportation costs 
can be augmented to allow for the introduction of risk as a determinant of trade flows as 
highlighted earlier.  With the introduction of uncertainty, a case can be made for a relationship 
between the risk posed by a trading partner and the trade flows between those partners. These 
sources of risk include within country sources like productivity shocks to the exporting country, 
nationwide strikes that halt production or hampers the processing rates at shipping ports, political 
and social instability, epidemics and natural disasters, as well as external sources such as accidents 
during transportation, or wanton acts of piracy. In general, I expect to find a significant and 
                                                          
31 Source: Global Terrorism Database 
65 
 
negative correlation between trade flows and trading partners’ levels of risk in an empirical 
analysis.  
For this analysis however, the country specific measure of risk used is the level of political stability 
and the absence of violence and terrorism in a country. This measure captures the likelihood that 
the government of the country will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism. This is a World Governance 
indicator that provides a percentile ranking system between 0 and 100% where the safer (riskless) 
countries have a higher score and the less safe (riskier) countries have a lower score. This implies 
that if the risk rating of the country is high, it is less risky and would suggest a higher level of 
exports from that country. Therefore, a positive coefficient of this measure of risk expected in the 
regression. With the balanced trade hypothesis or a less stringent variation of it which supposes a 
positive correlation between exports and imports, this finding would imply that both imports and 
exports between trading partners depend on not just distance, but the risk associated with a 
particular trading partner.  
The literature on the gravity models has been divided with regard to the correct specification of 
the empirical model applied in the panel data estimation: fixed effect versus random effect models. 
According to Gomez Herrera and Baleix (2012), the fixed effects approach would be ideal as this 
requires a potential correlation between the unobserved fixed effects and the other country specific 
regressors. The estimation of this process however eliminates all time-invariant regressors that are 
key determinants of trade such as distance, contiguity and other dummy variables, due to 
collinearity. On the other hand, the use of the random effects approach requires a stronger zero 
correlation assumption between the unobserved fixed effects and the other regressors. However, 
advocates of the approach argue that the use of country partner fixed effects instead of country 
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fixed effects decreases the likelihood of correlation between these unobserved fixed effects and 
the other regression variables, i.e. while specific unobserved country fixed effects will be highly 
correlated with the output and risk measures of that country, the unobserved partner fixed effects 
will have less to do with the individual country and as such, is more likely to be uncorrelated. This 
assumption is in line with the findings of Fratianni and Oh (2007) who test both these approaches 
on a panel dataset of 143 countries between 1980 and 2003 and determine that the random effect 
model is preferred to that of the fixed effect model.   With this background, I adopt a random 
effects approach in estimation.  
2.3 Empirical Analysis 
2.3.1 Estimation and Results 
The empirical model estimated is shown below: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6exp exp expijt it jt ij it jt ijGDP GDPpart dist risk riskpart contig              
          7 8 9 10 1145ij ij ij ij ij ijtcomlang comcol col colony curcol                     (21) 
Where 
expijt is the value of exports from country i  to partner j at time t  
expitGDP  is the natural log of GDP of exporting country i at time t  
jtGDPpart is the natural log of GDP of the partner country j at time t  
ijdist is the natural log of the distance between partner countries 
 expitrisk  is the risk measure of the exporting country i  at time t  
jtriskpart  is the risk measure of the partner country j at time t  
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ijcontig is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j are contiguous (share a border) 
ijcomlang   is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i  and j  share a common language 
ijcomcol  is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j have had a common colonizer 
after 1945 
ijcolony is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j have ever had a colonial 
relationship 
45ijcol is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j have had a colonial relationship 
after 1945 
ijcurcol is a dummy variable indicating whether both countries are currently in a colonial 
relationship 
Columns 1 2 and 3 of Table 15 below show the regression results derived from equation 21. 
In the first column, the standard gravity model is estimated in order to test the validity of the 
selected sample. The findings of the traditional gravity model are verified implying that the 
selected sample conforms to the findings in other studies.  The second column tests the validity of 
determining trade flows based on risk measures alone. There is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between exports and the risk measure of the exporting country and a 
negative but statistically insignificant relationship between exports and the risk rating of the 
partner country. This finding supports the hypothesis in as much as trade seems to be influenced 
by risk, but this however does not align with the prediction of how trade is impacted. In the third 
column, the full empirical model is tested, with exports regressed on distance and risk measures. 
The coefficients of distance and the risk measures are significant with distance being negatively 
correlated, the exporting country’s measure of the risk being positively correlated and the risk 
68 
 
measure of the trading partner being negatively correlated (and now statistically significant at the 
5% level). These findings imply that, an increase in the distance between trading partners 
decreases, consistent with the traditional gravity model. I however add that an increase in a 
country’s own measure of risk, increases its exports, while an increase in a trading partners risk 
measure decreases exports to that country. Keeping in mind that an increase in the risk measure 
implies a less risky partner, the last result seems contradictory at first glance. To resolve this 
contradiction, it is prudent to analyze what happens when a trading partner becomes less risky. 
Suppose country A is the exporting country and Country B is the importing country. If the increase 
in the risk measure of country B causes it to become much less risky than country A, from country 
B’s point of view, it would seek out a less risky country to trade with, thus reducing the imports 
from country A (which will be country A’s exports to B). This will manifest as a decline in exports 
from country A to country B as a result of country B becoming less risky, as is observed in the 
empirical findings.  
2.3.2 Introducing country pair risk measures 
The observation above suggests that the changes in individual risk measures alone cannot fully 
account for changes in trade patterns, but a more relative risk measure is called for, i.e. the changes 
in the risk measure of country A relative to country B. To account for this, a new interaction term; 
ijrelrisk  is introduced to equation 1 to yield the following; 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6exp exp expijt it jt ij it jt ijtGDP GDPpart dist risk riskpart relrisk              
          7 8 9 10 11 1245ij ij ij ij ij ij ijtcontig comlang comcol col colony curcol                      (22) 
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Table 15: Regression results of Export value on Distance and Risk Measures 
 Ln Exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln GDP of  1.410*** 1.403*** 1.405*** 1.405*** 1.405*** 1.410*** 
Exporter (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln GDP of 1.051*** 1.062*** 1.054*** 1.054*** 1.054*** 1.051*** 
Partner (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln Distance -1.346***  -1.346*** -1.346*** -1.344*** -1.345*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter  0.00161*** 0.00169*** 0.00181*** 0.00171***  
Risk  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Partner  -0.000625 -0.000992** -0.00124*** -0.00103**  
Risk  (0.157) (0.020) (0.004) (0.016)  
Relrisk    -0.00199***   
    (0.000)   
Abrisk     -0.00140*** -0.00136*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
comlang 0.841*** 1.048*** 0.842*** 0.842*** 0.843*** 0.842*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
col45 1.119*** 0.808*** 1.119*** 1.119*** 1.123*** 1.123*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
contig 1.149*** 3.809*** 1.158*** 1.154*** 1.145*** 1.138*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
comcol 1.330*** 1.547*** 1.330*** 1.329*** 1.327*** 1.327*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
curcol -3.091** -1.428 -3.094** -3.097** -3.100** -3.096** 
 (0.021) (0.266) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
colony 0.139 0.395** 0.140 0.140 0.133 0.132 
 (0.335) (0.038) (0.330) (0.332) (0.355) (0.360) 
_cons -34.45*** -46.32*** -34.43*** -34.41*** -34.38*** -34.41*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 218946 218946 218946 218789 218946 218946 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Estimating variations of equations 21 and 22 using random effects estimation procedure 
See appendix for a description of the indicator variables “Col45”, “Comcol”, and “Curcol”. 
“Relrisk” is a ratio of partner country risks and “Abrisk” is the absolute value of the difference in their risk ratings   
N is the number of data points used in each column. 
 
Where exp
ij
risk
relrisk
riskpart
 , is the ratio of the risk measures of both trading partners, and everything 
else is defined as above. Column 4 in Table 15 above summarizes the regression results based on 
equation 22.  
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Column 4 from Table 15 above shows a greater statistical significance of the risk factors on trade 
flows as all three risk measures are now statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of 
the risk interaction term itself is negative. This suggests that a general increase in the relative risk 
rating of the trade partners i.e. either a relative increase in the exporting country’s rating or a 
relative decrease in the importing country’s rating, implies a decrease in trade flows between them. 
Specifically, I examine the total impact of a change in each partner’s risk measure on the value of 
exports the exporting country sends to the partner. 
First, the total impact of a change in the exporting country’s risk rating on the export value is 
examined. This change given as 64
exp
exp jrisk riskpart



 

depends on the risk rating of the 
partner country alone. For an increase in the exporting country’s risk measure to lead to an increase 
in the exports to a partner country, 64 0
jriskpart

   . This implies that
6
4
jriskpart


  . This 
suggests that there exists a certain threshold level of a partner’s risk measure below which, an 
increase in the risk measure of the exporting country leads to a decrease in trade flows and above 
which, leads to an increase in trade flows. This threshold level in the sample of countries studied 
is 1.09932. This implies that for trading partners who are ranked below 1.099 (which according to 
the measure of risk used implies very risky trading partners), an increase in the exporting country’s 
risk measure will lead to a decrease in exports to the partner country. For countries ranked above 
1.099, an increase in the exporting country’s measure of risk will lead to an increase in exports to 
that country.33 
                                                          
32 This risk measure only applies to Iraq between 2003 and 2007, Sudan between 2009 and 2001, and the entire 
duration of study for Somalia  
33 This figure will be different as it is dependent on the countries studied and the time period examined. 
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Next, the total impact of a change in the partner country’s risk rating on the export value is 
examined. This change given as 65 2
expexp i
j
risk
riskpart riskpart



 

. This implies that for an increase in 
a trading partner’s risk measure to lead to an increase in exports from the exporting country, 
6
5 2
exp
0i
j
risk
riskpart

   , which implies that 25
6
expi jrisk riskpart


 . For the estimated data set, 5
6
0.623


 . As 
a result, an increase in a trading partner’s risk rank leads to an increase of exports from the 
exporting country only if 2exp 0.623i jrisk riskpart . The existence of these threshold values 
suggest that countries are stratified into groups, with positive trade growth only occurring within 
each group and not across, ceteris paribus (perhaps with the exception of high value commodities, 
like oil and precious metals).    
2.3.3 Accounting for differences in partner risk rankings 
The existence of the above threshold values also suggest that countries might be reluctant to trade 
with partners that are below a particular risk rating. This might imply that countries ranked farther 
apart might do less trade than countries ranked closer together. To test this likelihood, the 
following regression is run  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6exp exp expijt it jt ij it jt ijtGDP GDPpart dist risk riskpart abrisk              
          7 8 9 10 11 1245ij ij ij ij ij ij ijtcontig comlang comcol col colony curcol             (23) 
Where abrisk is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the risk ranking of the 
trading partners and everything else is defined same above. This measure captures just how much 
more risky a country is, compared to its trading partner. Column 5 in table 15 above summarizes 
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the results of regression equation 3 and column 6 tests its robustness to the exclusion of the 
individual risk measures.   
In column 5 of table 15 above, there is a negative and statistically significant correlation between 
the exports to a partner country and the difference in their risk rankings. This suggests that the 
greater the difference in risk rankings of trading partners, the lower the trade flows between them. 
This implies that countries ranked closer together according to their risk measure will tend to trade 
more than countries ranked further apart. In light of the relationship established above in figure 
16, this finding would mean that more developed countries would trade with other developed 
countries as they are ranked similarly, while the developing countries would only have each other 
with whom to trade. This implies that the assumption of the role of risk in trade lowering potential 
growth and development of countries might be valid and is something that deserves a closer look. 
2.3.4 Robustness checks 
There are two potential arguments that could be levied against the results thus far. The first is that 
the analysis has at yet, not accounted for the relationship between “within country” or internal 
trade and external trade. The classic argument resulting from the fact that the larger the economy, 
the more the internal trade is carried out in opposition to external trade, suggesting a negative 
correlation between internal trade measures and exports. This issue is addressed by Frankel and 
Romer (1999) who suggest that the size of internal trade can be instrumented for by the size of the 
population or the geographical area of the country. I adopt this methodology and test the robustness 
of the previous estimates to the inclusion of internal trade. The second argument is that the risk 
measure used in this analysis might be a reflection of the countries’ institutions and as such, can 
be generalized beyond just risk, but as the effect of the institutions in general on trade. To test this, 
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I include other institutional measures of both partner countries and it is expected that the better the 
institutional qualities the more trade is done suggesting a positive correlation between institutional 
measures and exports. These measures - also provided by the world governance indicators - capture 
corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness. If this assertion is true, and the risk-trade 
relationship established in the study so far is just the effect of institutions, then the inclusion of 
these institutional measures should alter the coefficients estimated for the risk measures (resulting 
in either a change in magnitude or reduction of significance), implying correlation between these 
measures and the risk measures. Tables 16 and 17 below capture the results of these robustness 
checks. Table 16 shows the results using the “abrisk” measure. The expected negative coefficients 
for population and area are observed suggesting that increases in internal trade lead to less external 
trade between partners. The inclusion of these internal trade proxies render the risk rankings 
insignificant34 but the “abrisk” measure is still significant implying a robust risk-trade relationship. 
All measures of institutions considered are positive and statistically significant as expected, but 
only the robustness of the exporter country risk measure is affected, the measures of partner 
country risk and “abrisk” remain significant. This, combined with the fact that the signs of these 
institutional variables are in opposition to those of risk, suggest that the mechanism through which 
risk affects trade is different from the other measures of institutions. This demonstrates that the 
risk-trade relationship is not just a reflection of the levels of institution. 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 When area is introduced, partner country risk is still significant but export country risk is insignificant.  
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Table 16: Robustness checks (with “abrisk” measures) 
 Ln Exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln GDP of  1.436*** 1.436*** 1.396*** 1.378*** 1.376*** 
Exporter (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln GDP of 1.043*** 1.079*** 1.045*** 1.047*** 1.038*** 
Partner (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln Distance -1.340*** -1.319*** -1.332*** -1.332*** -1.322*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter 0.000917 0.000553 -0.0000382 -0.000504 -0.00165*** 
Risk (0.103) (0.277) (0.945) (0.361) (0.006) 
Partner -0.000791 -0.00194*** -0.00171*** -0.00142*** -0.00232*** 
Risk (0.117) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) 
Abrisk -0.00142*** -0.00149*** -0.00147*** -0.00146*** -0.00141*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln population -0.0556***     
Exporter (0.000)     
Ln population 0.0155     
Partner (0.272)     
Ln area  -0.0780***    
Exporter  (0.000)    
Ln area  -0.0663***    
Partner  (0.000)    
Corruption of    0.00441***   
exporter   (0.000)   
Corruption of    0.00185***   
partner   (0.001)   
Gov. effectiveness    0.00641***  
Exporter    (0.000)  
Gov. effectiveness    0.00132**  
Partner    (0.042)  
Rule of Law     0.00821*** 
Exporter     (0.000) 
Rule of Law     0.00337*** 
Partner     (0.000) 
Constant -34.24*** -34.18*** -34.25*** -33.95*** -33.83*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 218946 218946 214279 214279 214279 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Estimating variations of equation 23 using random effects estimation procedure 
Full specification of equation 23 was estimated but only the relevant variables were reported 
“Abrisk” is the absolute value of the difference in their risk ratings   
N is the number of data points used in each column 
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Table 17: Robustness checks (with “relrisk” measures) 
 Ln Exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln GDP of  1.435*** 1.436*** 1.396*** 1.378*** 1.376*** 
Exporter (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln GDP of 1.043*** 1.079*** 1.046*** 1.049*** 1.038*** 
Partner (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln Distance -1.342*** -1.321*** -1.335*** -1.335*** -1.324*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter 0.00103* 0.000667 0.0000716 -0.000402 -0.00155** 
Risk (0.067) (0.191) (0.897) (0.468) (0.011) 
Partner -0.000991* -0.00214*** -0.00190*** -0.00155*** -0.00249*** 
Risk (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Relrisk -0.00198*** -0.00199*** -0.00202*** -0.00198*** -0.00194*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln population -0.0548***     
Exporter (0.000)     
Ln population 0.0161     
Partner (0.253)     
Ln area  -0.0775***    
Exporter  (0.000)    
Ln area  -0.0658***    
Partner  (0.000)    
Corruption of    0.00440***   
exporter   (0.000)   
Corruption of    0.00179***   
partner   (0.001)   
Gov. effectiveness    0.00642***  
Exporter    (0.000)  
Gov. effectiveness    0.00109*  
Partner    (0.094)  
Rule of Law     0.00821*** 
Exporter     (0.000) 
Rule of Law     0.00329*** 
Partner     (0.000) 
Constant -34.27*** -34.21*** -34.29*** -34.00*** -33.87*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 218789 218789 214122 214122 214122 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Estimating variations of equation 22 using random effects estimation procedure 
Full specification of equation 22 was estimated but only the relevant variables were reported 
 “Relrisk” is a ratio of partner country risks  
N is the number of data points used in each column 
 
76 
 
Table 17 above capture the same regressions with the “relrisk” measure have the same results as 
observed in table 16.   
2.3.5 Accounting for the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the Risk-Trade relationship  
The time frame studied in this paper includes a period during which risk was a very prominent 
issue at the forefront of international relations. Given the potential relationship between trade and 
inter country financing established by Rose and Spiegel (2002), it stands to reason that this strong 
statistical finding might have been influenced by the onset of the financial crisis in way of a 
response of now very risk averse trading partners to the potential consequences of risk. This 
necessitates an investigation into the pre-financial crisis relationship between trade flows and risk. 
To this end, equation 1 is re-estimated for two subsets of the full sample; pre and post 2008 for the 
same set of trading partnerships. Table 18 below captures the results of the regression from 
equation one for both sub samples.  
The even numbered columns in table 18 below correspond to the post crisis subsample while the 
odd numbers correspond to the pre-crisis subsample. Columns 1 and 2 estimate the traditional 
gravity model for both subsamples again confirming that each subsample provides similar results 
to the full sample and other works in the literature. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the gravity model 
with the risk measures alone. Here, I find a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between exports and the risk measure of the exporting country for both the pre and post financial 
crisis, as was the case for the full sample. The magnitude of the relationship however doubled after 
the onset of the financial crisis, implying that there was a higher response to risk after the onset of 
the financial crisis. The relationship between the exports and the risk measure of the partner 
country makes an even stronger case in support of this point. The pre-crisis coefficient was 
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statistically insignificant, while the post crisis coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 
the 5% level, similar to the findings in the full sample. Columns 5 and 6 which capture the results 
of regression with both distance and risk measures, shows the same increase from the pre-crisis to 
the post crisis periods.  
Table 18: Effect of financial crisis on the Risk-Trade relationship (“relrisk and “abrisk” excluded)35 
 Exports 
 Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Ln GDP of  1.349*** 1.378*** 1.334*** 1.346*** 1.343*** 1.363*** 
Exporter (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln GDP of 0.987*** 0.977*** 0.986*** 0.973*** 0.989*** 0.984*** 
Partner (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Distance -1.302*** -1.355***   -1.299*** -1.352*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter   0.00256*** 0.00595*** 0.00242*** 0.00566*** 
Risk   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Partner   0.000239 -0.00113** -0.000340 -0.00187*** 
Risk   (0.608) (0.029) (0.445) (0.000) 
comlang 0.787*** 0.756*** 0.973*** 0.942*** 0.790*** 0.759*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
col45 1.111*** 0.954*** 0.800*** 0.611*** 1.112*** 0.953*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
contig 1.181*** 1.202*** 3.752*** 3.896*** 1.205*** 1.240*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
comcol 1.246*** 1.278*** 1.467*** 1.511*** 1.250*** 1.282*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
curcol -2.751** -3.305** -1.171 -1.648 -2.764** -3.322** 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.279) (0.255) (0.017) (0.025) 
colony 0.363*** 0.346** 0.632*** 0.673*** 0.363*** 0.348** 
 (0.004) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.018) 
Constant -31.78*** -31.69*** -42.82*** -42.82*** -31.80*** -31.71*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 106174 112772 106174 112772 106174 112772 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Estimating variations of equation 21 using random effects estimation procedure 
See appendix for a description of the indicator variables “Col45”, “Comcol”, and “Curcol”. 
N is the number of data points used in each column. 
 
                                                          
35 Pre and post crisis periods are estimated for the same country pairs. The difference in the number of observations 
N is due to data limitations for the pre-crisis periods 
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Table 19 below shows the effect of the financial crisis on the trade-risk relationship paying 
particular attention to the effect of the “relrisk” and the “abrisk” measures.  Columns 1 and 2 in 
the table show the effect from the inclusion of the relative risk measure. I still observe the same 
pattern of increase in the individual risk measures, but find no statistical relevance of the relative 
risk measure in the post crisis period. This suggests that the threshold which might have existed in 
the pre-crisis period has been eliminated in the post crisis period, implying the elimination of the 
restrictions placed on existing and perhaps new trading partners. Columns 3 and 4 in the table 19 
show the effect from the inclusion of the “abrisk” measure36. Here, I do not observe a difference 
between the pre and post crisis periods, suggesting that countries that are farther apart with regard 
to their risk ranking still tend to trade less with each other. A combination of these two findings 
suggests that while countries in the post crisis period might be willing to alter their trading 
agreements as a result of higher aversion to fluctuating risk levels, they are still wary of the risk 
rating of potential trade partners, and are risk averse enough to still consider trading partners with 
similar risk measures for new partnerships.   
2.3.5: Model Performance tests 
Figures 1 to 18 in the appendix that follows this chapter show different graphical representations 
corresponding to different country pairs, comparing different fitted data to the actual bilateral trade 
data to determine which model fits the observed data better. The observed data (labeled “lnexp”) 
is compared to predictions based on the standard gravity model featuring the distance measure 
alone (“model 1”), an augmented version of the gravity model with risk measures alone (“model 
2”) and finally, a combination of both models 1 and 2 featuring risk and distance measures together 
                                                          
36 Columns 5 and 6 of table 3 show that the “abrisk” measures for both the pre and post crisis periods respectively 
are robust to the exclusion of the individual risk measures 
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(“model 3”). It is clear to see that the combination of risk and distance measures does a better job 
of explaining the actual bilateral trade flows than either measure alone, which validates the 
empirical findings. It should be noted however that certain country pairs’ bilateral trade is better 
predicted using risk measures alone (United States and Afghanistan, United States and Barbados, 
Russia and Iraq, Hong Kong and United States, China Mainland and the United States and Nigeria 
and Cameroon). This could be either because some countries are already putting more weight on 
risk measures over distance or that the farther away the trading partner; the more emphasis is 
placed on risk. A comparison across the different country pairs seems to mostly suggest the latter. 
The “take away” from the graphs in the appendix is that risk definitely has a role to play in 
determining the extent of bilateral trade. 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this paper, the role of risk in international bilateral trade is empirically tested and subsequently 
verified. There is evidence that suggests that the riskier a trading partner, the less likely it is for 
trade to occur. It is also found that a combination of distance and risk measures provide a better 
explanation of trade decisions than either variable alone. Despite this, there is reason to believe 
that these estimates for the relevance of risk is understated, as the empirical model used in this 
paper considers only one exogenous source of risk37. Other sources of risk not captured in the 
analysis include, but are not limited to; measures of risk associated with financial stability and 
production shocks, exchange rate volatility and currency misalignment, which are most likely to 
increase the relevance of risk in bilateral trade in the same direction with riskier countries trading 
less than their less risky counterparts.  
                                                          
37 The political stability of a country and the absence of violence and terrorism 
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Table 19: Effect of financial crisis on the Risk-Trade relationship (“relrisk” and “abrisk” included) 
 Ln Exports 
 Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Ln GDP of  1.343*** 1.363*** 1.343*** 1.364*** 1.350*** 1.379*** 
Exporter (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln GDP of 0.990*** 0.984*** 0.990*** 0.986*** 0.988*** 0.978*** 
Partner (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Distance -1.299*** -1.352*** -1.294*** -1.349*** -1.297*** -1.352*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter 0.00254*** 0.00571*** 0.00256*** 0.00567***   
Risk (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Partner -0.000590 -0.00195*** -0.000290 -0.00194***   
Risk (0.197) (0.000) (0.513) (0.000)   
Relrisk -0.00198** -0.000806     
 (0.017) (0.168)     
Abrisk   -0.00273*** -0.00273*** -0.00261*** -0.00267*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
comlang 0.791*** 0.760*** 0.792*** 0.763*** 0.789*** 0.760*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
col45 1.112*** 0.954*** 1.119*** 0.965*** 1.117*** 0.965*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
contig 1.202*** 1.239*** 1.185*** 1.213*** 1.159*** 1.175*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
comcol 1.249*** 1.282*** 1.246*** 1.279*** 1.243*** 1.276*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
curcol -2.766** -3.323** -2.792** -3.321** -2.776** -3.304** 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.015) (0.024) (0.016) (0.024) 
colony 0.361*** 0.347** 0.346*** 0.326** 0.347*** 0.325** 
 (0.005) (0.019) (0.007) (0.027) (0.006) (0.027) 
_cons -31.81*** -31.71*** -31.77*** -31.70*** -31.74*** -31.68*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 106017 112772 106174 112772 106174 112772 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Estimating variations of equations 22 and 23 using random effects estimation procedure 
See appendix for a description of the indicator variables “Col45”, “Comcol”, and “Curcol”. 
“Relrisk” is a ratio of partner country risks and “Abrisk” is the absolute value of the difference in their risk ratings   
N is the number of data points used in each column. 
 
These factors were omitted due to endogeneity issues in the empirical analysis. Finally, an attempt 
is made to highlight the effect of the onset of the financial crisis on the risk-bilateral trade 
relationship. From the results of the analysis, there is evidence to suggest that while risk had a 
significant role to play in determining trade flows before the onset of the financial crisis of 2008 
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and has become even more important. The persistence of distance as a determinant of trade flows 
over the years should not be underestimated either. Distance is no longer just a measure of the 
difference in spatial coordinates or a proxy for transportation costs with respect to international 
trade. Distance also represents trading agreements and partnerships that where initially formed 
when physical distance was much more of a barrier to trade, and these partnerships still persist to 
this day. Distance also has a risk component via insurance costs of transportation. It could be 
argued that the farther the distance between trading partners, the more likely the loss of the goods 
being transported and as such, the higher the cost to insure the goods during transport.  Both these 
points offer explanations as to why distance is still a valid component in determining trade flows. 
A potential significance of the risk measure on the growth rate of an economy through the avenue 
of trade is also highlighted. It is found that there is a threshold country risk measures that determine 
the pattern of trade flows between partners. This is because the countries prefer to trade with a 
partner as safe, if not safer. The effect of the difference between trade partners risk ranking on 
trade flows is also tested, and it is found that the larger the difference in risk rankings, the lower 
the trade flows. These two results point to the fact that countries will tend to do more trade with 
other countries of similar risk measures. This provides an alternative explanation as to why similar 
countries engage in trade as opposed to the theory of similar production capacities. This ultimately 
suggests that the risk measure of developing countries could potentially dissuade growth 
enhancing trade opportunities with more developed countries, accounting for part of the continued 
discrepancy between developed and developing countries. 
In conclusion, in the event of “true” globalization, economists would have to update their thinking 
about factors that influence bilateral trade. This will completely render the concept of borders null 
and void, and as a result, will completely restructure the very basis for choice in international 
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trading partners. The growth of technology and current work being done by scientists in the area 
of information dissemination and 3-D printing which indicate that transportation costs will soon 
become independent of distance, seems to suggest that while this future is far off, it is more likely 
every day and with the advent of these developments, economists would do well to come up with 
better predictors of bilateral trade as distance will no longer offer any information about trade, but 
a country’s idiosyncratic risk measure most definitely will.  
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Appendix 2.1: 
Table B: Data description and source 
Variable Description Source 
Bilateral 
Exports 
Value of total exports from 
a country to each trading 
partner 
International Monetary Fund Database. 
data.imf.org 
Total Exports Value of total exports from 
a country 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators 
Distance Arial distance between 
trading pairs 
French Research Center in International Economics  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8 
GDP Gross Domestic Product of 
each Country 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators  
Risk Measure Political stability of the 
Governments and the 
presence of terrorism in 
each country 
World Bank World Governance Indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-
indicators 
HDI Ranking Human development index 
ranking countries in 
descending order from most 
developed to least 
developed 
United Nations Development Program 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-
index-hdi 
Common 
language 
0 if no common language 
and 1 if both countries in a 
pair speak the same 
language 
French Research Center in International Economics  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8 
Contiguous 1 if both countries share a 
border and 0 if they do not 
French Research Center in International Economics  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8 
Col45 1 if both countries have had 
a colonial relationship after 
1945 and 0 if they do night 
French Research Center in International Economics  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8 
Comcol 1 if both countries have 
been colonized by the same 
country and 0 if they do not. 
French Research Center in International Economics  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8 
Curcol 1 if trading partners are 
currently in a colonial 
relationship 0 otherwise 
French Research Center in International Economics  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8 
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Table 2.1 cont. 
Variable Description Source 
colony 1 if one country in a pair 
was colonized by the other, 
and 0 otherwise 
French Research Center in International Economics  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8 
Population Number of people in each 
country 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators 
Area Surface area is a country's 
total area, including areas 
under inland bodies of water 
and some coastal waterways 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators 
Rule of Law Rule of Law captures 
perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the 
quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence 
World Bank World Governance Indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-
indicators 
Corruption Control of Corruption captures 
perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is 
exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites 
and private interests 
World Bank World Governance Indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-
indicators 
Government 
effectiveness 
Government Effectiveness 
captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies 
World Bank World Governance Indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-
indicators 
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Appendix 2.2 
For Figures 1 through 18, “lnexp” is the actual data of value of exports between partner countries, 
“Model 1” is the predicted export using distance measures alone, “Model 2” is the predicted 
measure using Risk measures alone and “Model 3” is the predicted export using a combination of 
distance and risk measures. 
Figure 1:  Sri-Lankan Exports to Bangladesh                Figure 2: United States’ Exports to Afghanistan 
                       
Figure 3: United States’ exports to Armenia                   Figure 4: United States’ exports to Barbados 
                         
Figure 5: United states’ Exports to Botswana                  Figure 6: United States’ exports to Nigeria 
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Figure 7: Nigeria’s exports to Cameroon               Figure 8: Luxembourg’s Exports to Canada 
                         
Figure 9: Russia’s exports to Iran                                                Figure 10: Russia’s exports to Iraq                                        
                           
Figure 11: United States’ exports to Iran                             Figure 12: United states’ exports to Iraq 
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Figure 13: Hong Kong’s exports to the US                                  Figure 14: Macao’s exports to the US  
                              
Figure 15: China Mainland’s exports to the US              Figure 16: United states’ exports to Hong Kong                             
                              
Figure 17: United States’ exports to Macao        Figure 18: United States’ exports to china mainland 
      
 
 
 
 
 
92 
 
Chapter 3 
The Path from Risk to Growth, through Trade 
3.1 Introduction 
The role of risk in international economic relations has been at the forefront of many studies in 
recent times due in large part to the fallout from the most recent financial crisis. While the majority 
of these studies focus on the effect of risk on growth through the channel of international finance, 
the effect of risk on growth via international trade flows has been largely neglected, especially 
given the role of trade in propagating systemic risk during the crisis of 2008. This paper thus 
focuses on the effect of risk on growth through this trade nexus. The precedence for such a study 
has been set in the literature by others that have evaluated the influence of different types of risks 
on bilateral trade. These include measures of risk such as political risk defined by policy 
uncertainty38 (Anderson and Marcoullier, 2002; Oh and Reuveny, 2010), political instability 
defined by regime instability and presence of terrorism (chapter two)39 or volatility from exchange 
rate fluctuations as in Thursby and Thursby (1987) and Broll and Eckwert (1999)40.   Admittedly, 
risk can be both the cause and the effect. To avoid circularity of the cause and effect, I focus on 
“exogenous risks”, particularly, the measure of risk suggested in chapter 2 which is a measure of 
political instability and the presence of terrorism in a country. This may be justified due to the 
unlikely possibility of reverse causality between growth and this risk measure41.    
                                                          
38 Specifically, risk associated with policies that affect successful business practices (trade) captured through survey 
indicators on contract enforcement, impartiality and transparency of Economic policies, police quality, and crime 
and resolution of disputes locally (Oh and Reuveny, 2010) 
39 For a more thorough review on other measures on risk in trade see chapter 2 
40 The literature on the impact of exchange rate volatility is vast. For a concise summary see McKenzie (1999) 
41 I acknowledge the sociological argument that a low growth environment may produce political instability or 
terrorism. But to date, no rigorous empirical study has been able to demonstrate this link and anecdotal evidence 
seems to suggest increases in inequality is the more likely culprit that triggers social unrest as opposed to general 
growth decline. Furthermore, the components of this measure such as frequency of disappearances, politically 
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These findings suggest that due to the impact of risk on trade flows, the contribution of trade to 
growth may have been incorrectly estimated. In addition, when risk has been used in growth 
regressions and the results been attributed to the contribution of risk through the finance nexus, 
the contribution of risk to trade has inadvertently been attributed to finance, possibly 
overestimating the deleterious effects of finance on growth. The comparative effect of the financial 
impact to trade impact during the financial crisis highlighted in chapter one, seems to point to this 
conclusion as well. This study therefore examines the role of trade on growth accounting for the 
difference in its effect in the absence and presence of risk, with the aim of accounting for the role 
of risk on growth, through the trade nexus. A secondary consequence of my study is its contribution 
to the debate as to the efficiency of outward oriented trade policies on growth. With the fact that 
risk is a factor in trade flow determination, outward oriented policies alone cannot promote growth; 
they have to be supported by stabilization policies, which in turn generates more trade.  
The relevance of this study cannot be overstated due to the well-known relationship between trade 
and growth. It has been suggested that trade contributes to growth either through capital 
accumulation or its effect on innovation and technological spill over (Lopez, 2005). Theoretically, 
Santacreu (2015) proposes that trade enters growth via research and development increasing the 
chance of success and leading to higher output. Trade is estimated to be responsible for about 65% 
of the increase in growth in developing countries. Empirically, increased output has been shown 
to be a direct result of trade in technology through increased domestic innovation (Schneider, 
2005). It therefore stands to reason that factors that impact trade should also impact growth. To 
this end, I model the impact of the exogenous determinants of trade (distance and risk) on growth 
                                                          
motivated assassinations and ethnic conflicts reinforce the one-way causality from this measure to growth, as growth 
is not a sufficient condition for these outcomes. 
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and empirically test their validity. While a broader definition of risk spans a variety of sources of 
uncertainty in the delivery of previously agreed amount of goods, the problem of reverse causality 
suggests that this definition of risk be limited to more exogenous variables indicating that the 
estimates generated in this study are lower bounds. In this paper, political instability and the 
presence of terrorism in import partner countries are used as exogenous sources of risk stemming 
from a supply shocks. In addition, I also consider risk factors associated with the export partner’s 
demand  (e.g., demand fluctuations measured by their risk ratings and their previous period’s 
growth rate) and determine their effect on growth rates of the country of concern.42  
An overview of the literature indicates some ambivalence on the impact of trade on growth.  For 
example, Lopez’s (2005) extensive review of the literature suggests a mixed record of success in 
trade promoting policies. One explanation for this, under the purview of the “new new” trade 
theory, is that the impact of trade on growth can have both pro and anti-growth effects when 
considering heterogeneous firms (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2008). On a more macroeconomic 
level which is more in line with this study, the arguments for the mixed growth performance of 
countries engaged in trade promotion can be split into two primary camps: the first is that success 
is due to macroeconomic stability (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999); the second suggests that a 
commitment to outward-oriented policies, rather than macroeconomic stability drives the success 
of these countries (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 2002).43  The approach in this paper is, however, 
more in line with Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) that macroeconomic stability determines the 
                                                          
42 While political instability and terrorism are likely to be generally exogenous to trade and growth, demand driven 
risk factors may or may not be independent of factors contributing to growth in the primary country of concern, for 
example, if they are associated with systemic factors such as global slowdown. In the empirical section, I address this 
issue by introducing time fixed effects to capture the economic downturn of 2008.  
43 See also Kreuger (1990) who viewed the success stories in East Asia as solely due to a shift in trade strategy to 
outward-oriented policies in these countries. 
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success of outward – oriented trade policies. In chapter 2, I empirically show that countries self-
select themselves into strata based on political stability and terrorism rankings and as such, tend 
to trade more with countries that have similar levels of stability. This suggests that the success of 
outward oriented policies may only serve to increase trade flows as long as the trading partner is 
less risky (more macro-economically stable by the standards of any of the risk measures discussed 
earlier).  
This introduction of risk also casts doubt on the solutions that have been suggested to help 
developing countries grow faster through trade. For example, once risk is allowed in, it is no longer 
clear whether a reduction of trade barriers in advanced countries would expand imports from the 
developing countries. Rather, such a policy is likely to mainly increase trade among advanced 
economies primarily due to the risk factor posed by their developing counterparts which acts as a 
deterrent to increased trade flows. Therefore, policy makers in these risky countries will need to 
take this into account when formulating plans designed to promote growth through trade. What 
follows is therefore a rigorous analysis to both theoretically and empirically provide evidence to 
support this assertion. 
To address these questions, I model a dynamic trade relationship in which a particular country 
engages in trade with multiple partners. The country first imports capital goods from its trading 
partners and uses them in the production process. It then consumes, saves and exports from said 
output. I make the added assumption that the capital imports augment the local capital, which 
implies that the higher the capital imports, the higher the output. This is in line with Hallward-
Driemeier et. al (2002) who find that increase in imports of capital goods led to productivity gains 
in a dataset of five Asian countries. I also account for the role of export growth on economic 
growth, both through the balanced trade assumption and potential externalities leading to increase 
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in technology that ultimately enhances growth. In this paper, the volume of trade however, depends 
not only on traditional factors that impact trade, such as output and distance, but also on measures 
of risk. Distance is modelled in the traditional sense, with an increase in distance implying an 
increase in transportation costs ultimately leading to less trade.  
Empirically, this study draws inspiration from Frankel and Romer (1998) from here on FR, who 
estimate a country’s bilateral trade using the geographical measures in the gravity model 
(excluding GDP of both partners due to reverse causality between GDP and growth) and then 
aggregate the estimated bilateral trade estimates for each country over all the partners to obtain an 
exogenous measure of trade (exogenous to the growth rate). Here, I follow the same process but 
estimate this for a panel dataset as opposed to the cross sectional dataset by FR, this is because 
cross country empirical studies are not robust and offer no evolving mechanism by which trade 
affects growth (Lopez, 2005). As a result, I opt for a panel data set as the time series component 
provides that added dimensionality (Dollar and Kraay, 2003). I extend the FR paper by adding the 
risk measure to the individual estimates of trade of both partners before aggregating and obtaining 
the estimates of trade. The study proposes to highlight the difference (if any) that the inclusion of 
risk in trade may have on the impact of trade on growth. It does so, by comparing both models 
(with and without the risk measure) for the same set of countries for the same time period.    
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section two discusses the theoretical set up and 
validation of my premise, as well as the consequences I intend to test empirically. Section 3 
discusses the data, empirical analysis and results, while section four concludes. 
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3.2 Theoretical Validation 
3.2.1 The standard Model 
Consider the following open production economy, infinite horizon, representative agent model. 
For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, I assume no population growth and no 
depreciation. Agents maximize lifetime utility by choosing consumption and savings over time. In 
addition, they also import capital goods (raw materials) which are used to augment the production 
process. The country incurs transportation cost of , which is defined as an average cost per unit 
per distance of transporting goods, i.e. it costs  to transport one unit of an import good one unit 
of the distance travelled, so to transport j units across k miles, the total cost to the importing country 
will be  kj. This is analogous to the iceberg shipping cost assumption that relates greater distance 
to greater transportation costs. Importers then make contractual agreements based on future 
expected export revenues. Given the incompleteness of capital markets however, particularly those 
in less developed countries where such forms of risk are predominant, it is often not possible to 
hedge such risks. This is compounded by the unexpected nature of the events, such as terrorism or 
social unrest which will potentially cause trading partners to be cautious when entering into 
contracts and as such, the potential for contract cancellation is factored into this analysis.   
The agents in this economy choose the volume of imports to purchase from their import trading 
partners, and a possibility that this contract is not upheld is accounted for. The weight assigned to 
each trading partner that represents the belief of the agents in the country of concern that the 
contract is upheld by the partner (between 0 and 1) is modelled as a function of the trading partner’s 
risk measure such that, the riskier a trading partner, the lower the weight assigned to the receipt of 
imports. On the demand side, the exporting agents also face the same threat of contract failure and 
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assigns weights to the export trading partners based on their risk rating as well. As such, the 
weights assigned have the following properties 
   0 , ' 1j j k kR R   , such that  ' 0j jR  and  ' 0k kR      (24) 
 and  are weights assigned to import and export partners respectively, indicating the potential 
for a negative unexpected shock. As a result, agents in this country enter into contracts expecting 
that the contractual volume of trade will be met (i.e. i = i =1) but plan for unexpected shocks (the 
possibility that 1i  , 1i  ) when deciding the extent of trade with each partner country, given 
passed behavior. The closer the weight assigned to a country is to 1, the more trade with that 
country44. 
R is the risk rating of import partner j and export partner k. 
This implies that observed imports at time t is 
   1t j j j j
j
M R m d      Mt tR C D m      (25)45 
Where  
tM  is the observed imported capital at time t 
j is the weight assigned to partner country j 
jR is the risk rating of risk partner j 
 is the transportation cost 
                                                          
44 In essence, agents will engage in trade if ( ) ( ) 1E E    
45 See appendix for proof of aggregation 
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jd is the distance between the importing country and trading partner j 
 t R is the aggregated weight assigned to all import trading partners such that  ' 0t R   
tm is total imports at time t specified by contract 
MD is the sum of distances between country i  and all J  import trading partners 
 M M MC D N D  46is the fraction remaining after transportation costs are deducted from all 
import partners such that  ' 0MC D  , and MN is the number of import trading partners 
 
Implying that 0
F
t
M
k
D



and 0
F
tk
R



        (26) 
Similarly, Observed exports at time t is given as 
   Xt t tX R C D x          (27) 
Where  t R  is aggregated weight assigned to all export trading partners such that  ' 0t R   
XD is the sum of distances between country i  and all K export trading partners 
And tx is the total export at time t specified by contract 
This also implies that 0t
X
X
D



and 0t
X
R



       (28) 
This implies that the production function is of the form 
 ,Dt tf k M            (29) 
                                                          
46 See appendix 
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Where D
tk and tM are domestic and imported capital respectively 
 
Given the well-established “benefits from trade” argument and the consequence of specialization 
that is inherent within it, it is reasonable to expect countries to specialize in the production of 
capital goods for which they have comparative advantage and import those which they do not, 
making the relationship complementary in the production process. As a result, I make the 
following assumptions about the production function 
 1 , 0Dt tf k M            (30) 
 11 , 0Dt tf k M            (31) 
 2 , 0Dt tf k M            (32) 
 12 , 0Dt tf k M            (33) 
where subscripts 1 and 2 indicate partial derivatives with respect to the first and second arguments 
respectively. 
Equations 7 and 8 highlight the usual assumption of diminishing marginal returns to capital. 
Equation 9 shows the positive role of adding imported capital goods to augment production. 
Equation 10 captures the benefit of trade to the returns to capital, due to the fact that these imported 
capital goods improve productivity predicated on the complementarity assumption47. With these 
                                                          
47 This is in line with previous studies in the literature, particularly Lee (1995) and Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008) 
who suggest that importing intermediate (capital) goods lead to higher productivity. 
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specified, output in period t, is allocated to consumption, investment and the rest is intended for 
the contractual exports, thus the budget constraint is given below48 
  1 1,D D Dt t t t t tf k M k k c X                         (34) 
where, tc is consumption at time t,  1tX  is observed exports. The weights assigned to each trading 
partner are based on previous behavior and is known at time t, and as such, the agents choose the 
import and export contract volume, given these weights, resulting in a deterministic production 
function49.  
  
Since the timing adopted in this study implies that imports take place before exports and as such 
is observable before the export decision is made, the balanced trade assumption introduced in this 
study implies that observed imports are equivalent to the expected exports, i.e.  
 1t tm X             (35) 
Which implies that         1M Xt t t tM R R C D C D x        (36) 
Therefore, agents in this economy maximize expected lifetime utility50  
0
t
t
t
u c


 subject to 
equations (27), (34) and (36)  
                                                          
48 All variables in per capita terms 
49 The expectation of observed imports and exports are equal to the contractual agreements, i.e. ( )t tE M m and 
1 1( )t tE X x  . Therefore, making the decision of how much to trade using the belief that the contract will be 
upheld, only serves to limit trade with riskier trading partners with a higher probability of experiencing a negative 
shock. 
50 With the utility function satisfying the usual assumptions of concavity and Inada conditions 
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Next, I solve the intertemporal problem  
       
1 1
1 1 1 1
, ,
0
max ,
D
t t t
t D D D
t t t t t t t t t t
c k x
t
L u c f k M x c k k X x 
 

   

          (37) 
First order conditions 
0
t
L
c

 

 ' 0t tu c            (38) 
1
0
D
t
L
k 

 

 1 1 1 1, 1Dt t t tf k M               (39) 
1
0
t
L
x 

 

     21 ,D Mt t tf k M R C D         (40) 
From equation 17  
 
   2
1
,Dt t M
t
f k M
R C D


        (41) 
From equations 38 and 39 
 
 
 1 1 1
1
'
, 1
'
t D
t t
t
u c
f k M
u c
  

   
        (42) 
Suppose   lnt tu c c    1
1
1 1
' , 't t
t t
u c u c
c c


   , equation 19 is resolved to yield the growth rate 
of the economy  g c  
   1 1 1 1, 1 1Dt t t t
t
c c
g c f k M
c
  

     
       (43) 
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This implies that the effect of a change in risk or distance on growth rates is given by the following 
equations 
              12 1 1 1
( )
, ' ' 0D M X M Xt t t t t
g c
f k M R R x C D C D C D C D
D
   

    

   (44) 
             12 1 1 1
( )
, ' ' 0D M Xt t t t t t t
g c
f k M C D C D x R R R R
R
   

       
   (45) 
Equations 21 and 22 above suggest that the determinants of trade have an effect on the growth rate 
of an economy. Increases in the factors that deter trade negatively impact the rate of growth, further 
highlighting the assertion that increase in trade is beneficial for growth. The fact that risk is shown 
above to have an effect on the growth rate suggests that the effect of trade may have indeed been 
incorrectly estimated in previous empirical studies.  
3.2.2 Theoretical extension: Accounting for trade externalities 
Due to the findings of positive spillover effects or externalities from trade51, I incorporate the 
contribution of exports to productivity either through learning-by-doing or technological 
externalities by introducing a function “g” of exports to the production function, such that, an 
increase in exports leads to an increase in externalities (  ' 0g X  ), which ultimately increases 
output. This implies that the production function is of the form 
  , ,Dt t tf k M g X           (46) 
Such that  
  1 , , 0Dt t tf k M g X           (47) 
  11 , , 0Dt t tf k M g X           (48) 
  2 , , 0Dt t tf k M g X           (49) 
  3 , , 0Dt t tf k M g X           (50) 
                                                          
51 See Lopez (2005) for a detailed list of studies 
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  12 , , 0Dt t tf k M g X           (51) 
  13 , , 0Dt t tf k M g X           (52) 
 
where subscripts 1, 2 and 3 indicate partial derivatives with respect to the first, second and third 
arguments respectively. 
Equations 47 and 48 once again highlight the usual diminishing returns to capital. Equations 49 
and 50 show the benefit of adding imported capital goods to the production process as well as the 
positive externalities from exports. Equations 51 and 52 capture the benefit of trade to the returns 
to capital, due to the fact that these imported capital goods and externalities improve productivity. 
Similar to the standard model above, agents in this economy maximize expected lifetime utility 
 
0
t
t
t
u c


 subject to the budget constraint    1 1, ,D D Dt t t t t t tf k M g X k k c X      
This yields the following first order conditions 
 ' 0t tu c              (53) 
  1 1 1 1 1, , 1Dt t t t tf k M g X                (54) 
       1 11 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1
, , , , 'D Dt tt t t t t t t t t
t t t
t
M X
f k M g X f k M g X g X
X x x
x

          
  

  
     

 (55) 
Equations 31 and 32 imply that 
          
1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
, , 1 , , , , 'D D Dt t tt t t t t t t t t t
t t t
X M X
f k M g X f k M g X f k M g X g X
x x x

  
         
  
     
             
(56) 
Also assuming the same utility function  
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    1 1 1 1 1, , 1 1Dt t t t t
t
c c
g c f k M g X
c
   

     
      (57) 
This then implies that  
       1 112 1 1 1 13 1 1 1 1
( )
, , , , ' 0D Dt tt t t t t t tM X
M Xg c
f k M g X f k M g X g X
D D D
        
 
  
  
 (58) 
       1 112 1 1 1 13 1 1 1 1
( )
, , , , ' 0D Dt tt t t t t t t
M Xg c
f k M g X f k M g X g X
R R R
        
 
  
  
 (59) 
Equations 58 and 59 show that the findings are robust to the inclusion of externalities form trade 
as the same relationship is also obtained as in the standard model above.  
In order to corroborate the theoretical hypothesis, I test for the potential error in estimating the 
effect of trade on growth by looking at the effects of two trade instruments (one with risk and one 
without) on the rate of growth.  
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Data 
For the empirical analysis, I have annual data for 169 countries with 179 trading partners each, 
between 2002 and 2013. The measure of import risk (supply side shocks) used is the measure of 
political stability and absence of terrorist attacks of the importing partners, while the measure of 
export risk (demand side shocks) is the measure of political stability and absence of terrorist of the 
exporting partners as well as the lagged growth rate of the exporting partner countries. These 
measures send signals to partner countries and they are able to make trade decisions given these 
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parameters. Growth rates are measured typically as the annual percentage change in real GDP, 
while trade share is the summation of exports and imports as a fraction of GDP52.  
3.3.2 Methodology 
Typically, when the question of the role of trade in growth is analyzed, an instrument is used in 
place of actual trade flows due to the potential reverse causality between growth and trade. The 
accuracy of this instrument to properly capture the effect of trade and yet side step the problem of 
reverse causality is key to an accurate depiction of the role of trade on growth. In this study, I will 
put the instrument into a weak and strong instrument test by considering two things: first is the 
correlation between the instrument and trade flows and the second is the degree of exogeneity of 
the variables that constitute my instruments. The analysis that follows is split into two stages: the 
first stage predicts and subsequently selects appropriate instruments for trade flows53 using the 
traditional gravity model as a starting point, while the second stage shows the effect of the selected 
instruments on the rate of growth54. 
3.3.2.1 Stage 1 
Taking a page from FR, I generate estimates for trade flows using purely exogenous factors that 
influence trade but are not influenced by growth rates. This implies that GDP levels are eliminated 
from the standard gravity model, but my analysis differs from FR in that I add my exogenous 
measures of risk to generate other instruments for trade. Furthermore, FR points out that 
                                                          
52 A full description of all variables used and sources can be found in the appendix 
53 I use the test suggested by Stock, Wright, and Yogo. (2002) of an F-Statistic greater than 10 in the first stage 
regression to judge the strength of the potential trade instruments 
54 The fact that bilateral estimates (trade from country i to partner j at time t) are obtained in the first stage which are 
then aggregated for use in the second stage (all trade from country i at time t) prohibits the use of standard IV 
methods, where both stages are estimated together because the indexes do not match. Hence the two stage approach 
that is taken here.    
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international trade is influenced by the level of internal trading in each country and suggests that 
the area of the country and the population within should be used as proxies to measure the level of 
internal trade. As a result, I estimate the following equation: 
0 1 2 3 4 1 5 6 7ln ln ln ln lnijt ij it jt jt it jt ittrade dist xrisk prisk gro area area pop                    
       
8 9 10 11 12 13 14ln 45jt ij ij ij ij ij ij ijtpop contig comlang comcol col colony curcol              
55(60) 
Where 
ijttrade is the sum of country i’s exports and imports from its trading partner j at t  
ln ijdist is the natural log of the distance between partner countries i  and j  
 itxrisk  is the risk measure of the exporting country i  at time t  
jtprisk  is the risk measure of partner country j at time t  
1jtgro   is the growth rate of partner country j at time 1t   
ln itarea  is the natural log of the area of exporting country i at time t  
ln jtarea is the natural log of the area of partner country j at time t  
ln itpop  is the natural log of the population of exporting country i at time t  
ln jtpop is the natural log of the population of partner country j at time t  
ijcontig is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j are contiguous (share a border) 
ijcomlang   is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i  and j  share a common language 
ijcomcol  is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j have had a common colonizer 
after 1945 
                                                          
55 Other variations of this model are also estimated and the results are reported in section 3.3 
108 
 
ijcolony is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j have ever had a colonial 
relationship 
45ijcol is a dummy variable indicating whether countries i and j have had a colonial relationship 
after 1945 
ijcurcol is a dummy variable indicating whether both countries are currently in a colonial 
relationship 
Estimates of trade flows for different variations of this model are then generated and used as 
instruments for trade flows. Correlation coefficients are provided to determine how closely each 
of these instruments matches the actual trade flow data. 
3.3.2.2 Stage 2 
In this stage, I use the estimates of trade flows with the highest correlation coefficients generated 
in stage one as instruments of trade and determine the effect of the selected instruments (one with 
risk measures and one without) on growth for the same set of countries and hence, determine the 
more accurate effect of trade on growth. The inherent assumption that the degree of growth of 
technology is in part dependent on the degree of trade in a country follows directly from the 
theoretical model above (either through accumulation of capital imports or through technological 
spillover) and is also in line with other works in the literature (Frimpong and Oteng-Abayie (2006) 
and Lopez (2005)). So the standard output formula generally given as 
it t t tY A K L
             (61) 
Where K is capital stock, L  is labor and tA  is the indicator for technology, can be extended to 
introduce measures of trade and other potential factors that drive growth. 
ln ln ln lnit t t tY A K L            (62) 
ln ln ln lnit t t tY A K L                (63) 
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Where ln itY is the growth rate of countries i at time t  
ln tA is the change in technology  
ln tK is investment  
ln tL is change in labor 
In this study, I use the rate of savings as a fraction of GDP as a proxy for investment and the change 
in the total population as a proxy for the change in labor. Finally trade shares via tA  and as a result, 
in stage two I run the following regression 
0 1 2 3ln lnit t it it itgro pop sav ts                (64) 
Where  
itgro  is the growth rate of country i  at time t   
ln tpop is the population growth rate of country i  at time t  
itsav  is the savings rate of country i  at time t  
ln itts is the natural log of the instrument of trade share of country i  at time t  
Finally, the average contribution of trade to growth over time, according to the selected 
instruments of trade, is then estimated and compared to determine the differences between the 
effects of the inclusion and exclusion of risk measures. The results of both stages are presented in 
the following subsection. 
3.3.3 Empirical results and analysis  
3.3.3.1 Stage I results 
The results for equation (60) are given in table 20 below. The expected signs for distance, 
population and the area of each country are obtained and are robust to the inclusion of other 
parameters in columns 1 through 6. Columns 1 and 2 highlight the importance of introducing the 
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exogenous measures of risk to the gravity model, as I find that both risk measures are statistically 
significant with an increase in this particular measure of risk leading to an increase in trade flows.56 
Columns 3 and 5 which include the measure of  risk from demand side shocks suggest that the risk 
rating of the exporting country i is more robust since its inclusion (column 3) renders the lag of 
partner country j’s growth rate insignificant. Furthermore, the introduction of the “relrisk” and 
“abrisk”57 measures yield the expected negative signs as in chapter two, suggesting that the farther 
apart countries are ranked according to their risk rating, the less they trade. The final measure 
“correlation” captures the correlation coefficient between the estimates of trade from each model 
in and the observed trade flows. It is observed as was reported in chapter two that the models with 
risk factors match the observed trade flows more than the model with just distance. As a result of 
the correlations, I select the model with the highest correlation coefficient (model from column 3) 
to use in instrumenting trade flows in stage two. The model from column 1 is used as the standard 
with which I compare the effect of trade on growth when I introduce risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 It is important to note that with measure of risk used in this study, the higher the rating the lower the risk of the 
country. Therefore, a positive slope implies that the safer a country, the more it trades. 
57 t
t
t
xrisk
relrisk
prisk
 and abrisk xrisk prisk   
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Table 20: Estimating Trade Flow Instruments using the gravity model 
Variable Ln Trade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln Distance -0.853*** -0.852*** -0.860*** -0.860*** -0.861*** -0.859*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Ln Population 1.365*** 1.316*** 1.161*** 1.159*** 1.205*** 1.161*** 
(partner j) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Ln Population 1.553*** 1.524*** 1.409*** 1.408*** 1.407*** 1.408*** 
(Country i) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Ln Area -0.566*** -0.511*** -0.430*** -0.430*** -0.477*** -0.431*** 
(Country i) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln Area  -0.640*** -0.586*** -0.488*** -0.487*** -0.519*** -0.488*** 
(Partner j) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
       
Country i  0.00816*** 0.0105*** 0.0106***  0.0105*** 
Risk   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
       
Partner j  0.00341*** 0.00460*** 0.00446*** 0.00425*** 0.00460*** 
Risk  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Lag Growth   0.000683 0.000288 0.000980* 0.000688 
Partner j    (0.188) (0.586) (0.058) (0.184) 
       
Relrisk    -0.00114*   
    (0.077)   
       
Abrisk      -0.000876** 
      (0.038) 
       
_cons -9.175*** -9.761*** -7.560*** -7.527*** -6.793*** -7.528*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Correlation 0.3659 0.3917 0.4118 0.4121 0.3830 0.4116 
N 259528 257641 231473 231242 232158 231473 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Estimating variations of equations 60 using random effects estimation procedure 
The full of variables including the indicator variables are included but not reported 
 “Relrisk” is a ratio of partner country risks and “Abrisk” is the absolute value of the difference in their risk ratings   
Correlation indicates the correlation between the estimated trade flows in each model. 
N is the number of data points used in each column. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
 
Table 21: Estimating Trade flows and accounting for risk mitigation 
 Ln Trade 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Ln Distance -0.867*** -0.863*** -0.825*** -0.853*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country i 0.00908*** 0.0116*** 0.0115*** 0.0114*** 
Risk (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Partner j 0.00264*** 0.00390*** 0.00369*** 0.00373*** 
Risk (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lag Growth 0.00293*** 0.00405*** 0.00419*** 0.00454*** 
Partner j (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Abrisk -0.000720* -0.00171*** -0.00147*** -0.00131*** 
 (0.095) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) 
DCP 0.00934***    
country i (0.000)    
DCP 0.00893***    
Partner j (0.000)    
LL  0.0117***   
country i  (0.000)   
LL  0.00906***   
Partner j  (0.000)   
PPD   0.00942***  
country i   (0.000)  
PPD   0.00822***  
Partner j   (0.000)  
PPDF    0.00906*** 
country i    (0.000) 
PPDF    0.00819*** 
Partner j    (0.000) 
_cons -4.223*** -4.949*** -4.968*** -4.374*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Correlation 0.4995 0.4909 0.4986 0.502 
N 201189 192000 186497 187694 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Table shows estimates of variations of 
equations 60 using random effects estimation procedure. All variables from equation 60 are included in the 
regression but only relevant variables are reported.“Relrisk” is a ratio of partner country risks and “Abrisk” is the 
absolute value of the difference in their risk ratings. DCP is domestic credit to the private sector, LL is liquid 
liabilities, PPD is private credit by domestic money banks and PPDF is private credit by domestic money banks and 
other financial institutions. Correlation indicates the correlation between the estimated trade flows in each model 
and N is the number of data points used in each column 
 
 
With the introduction of risk, I will be remiss if I did not consider certain aspects of the economy 
that have been put in place to mitigate risk. Since to the best of my knowledge there are currently 
no credit-markets designed to deal with the potential issues of the type of shocks I am suggesting, 
I turn to the financial markets for a possible solution at least, to combat price fluctuations as 
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discussed earlier58. As a result, I use the level of financial depth as a proxy for risk mitigation. The 
idea is that countries with a higher level of financial depth are more likely to come up with 
instruments that can eliminate at least some of the risk associated with trade59.  Table 2 above 
introduces 4 measures of financial depth in order to estimate which one leads to the best instrument 
for trade flows. These measures are domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP 
(DCP), liquid liabilities as a percentage of GDP (LL), private credit by domestic money banks as 
a percentage of GDP (PPD) and finally, private credit by domestic money banks and other financial 
institutions as a percentage of GDP (PPDF). All measures of financial depth yield positive and 
statistically significant coefficients, suggesting that the higher the level of financial depth in the 
country, the higher the trade flows. The correlations between the measures of trade generated by 
the addition of these new measures are higher than the measures with just risk alone, suggesting a 
better match with the observed trade flows. As a result, the estimates from model 10 (column 4 in 
table 2 above) is chosen as the third instrument of trade accounting for risk mitigation, for analysis 
in stage 2.  
3.3.3.2 Stage 2 Results 
In this stage, using the three selected estimates of trade flows from stage 1 as instruments for trade, 
I examine the true nature of the impact of trade on growth. In addition to the correlations however, 
I perform the Stock, Wright, and Yogo. (2002) test to determine instrument strength and obtain the 
following results60 
 
 
                                                          
58 While this is not expressed in the theoretical justification, the data will no doubt reflect risk owing to price and 
currency fluctuations and the introduction of financial depth measures will suppress some of this risk. 
59 An example of this would be the introduction of derivatives designed to mitigate exchange rate fluctuations. 
60 Initial tests of endogeneity confirm that trade is in fact endogenous to growth as hypothesized earlier.  
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Table 22: Instrument variable strength test 
Instrument R-squared Adjusted R-squared F-Statistic P value 
Model 1 (distance only) 0.02 0.01 1.503 0.2204 
Model 4 (distance & Risk) 0.02 0.02 8.582 0.003 
Model 10 (distance, Risk and financial 
depth) 
0.03 0.02 18.576 0.000 
 
Table 22 above suggests that while all three models have relatively low explanatory power for 
trade flow determination61, the standard model for instrumenting trade flows using just distance 
measures alone is not an appropriate instrument of trade. This is evidenced by the p value which 
leads to a rejection of the alternate hypothesis that the coefficient from the regression of this 
instrument on observed trade flows is significantly different from zero. Models 4 and 10 however 
show a level of significance suggesting better explanatory power for trade flows with Model 10 
passing the F-stat >10 condition suggested by Stock, Wright, and Yogo. 2002. These results back 
up the earlier conclusions based on correlations that Model 10 does the best job explaining trade 
flows, followed closely by Model 4.   
The assumption is that the measure from stage one that best matches the observed trade flows will 
provide the most accurate relationship between trade and growth. To test this, equation (64) is 
estimated and table 23 below provides the estimates62. From table 23, I find the expected signs for 
the change in population, area and savings rate, all of which suggest that an increase in either will 
lead to an increase in the rate of growth. All instruments of trade flows show a positive and 
statistically significant effect of trade on growth. Columns 1 and 2 use predicted trade flows from 
stage 1 of my analysis based on models 1 and 4 corresponding to benchmark case with no risk 
                                                          
61 Which is to be expected as GDP, a major driving force of trade flows has been removed from the analysis due to 
reverse causality concerns 
62 We also account for the area of a country with the assumption that the larger the area the more room for 
expansion, hence the higher the rate of growth. 
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measure and the case and full measure of risk, respectively. Both models indicate strong positive 
role of trade in growth but the inclusion of risk measures (model 4) performs better as indicated 
by the higher coefficient size and significance. To bring in financial depth as indicator of risk 
mitigation, predicted trade flows from model 10 of stage 1 are also included (column 5). However, 
here I face small loss of observations due to more limited data. Therefore, to make the comparison 
with models 1 and 4 meaningful, I re-estimate those models with the more limited data (columns 
3 and 4).  The results confirm the risk mitigating role of finance in addressing the adverse trade 
effects on growth. This is seen by the smaller coefficient of trade when it is constructed by 
including financial depth.  Notice also that the same pattern is observed for models 1 and 4 as in 
the previous case.  
Table 23: Role of trade on growth 
 Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Population  26.77*** 26.94*** 22.23*** 22.36*** 26.63*** 
Growth (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) 
      
Ln Area 0.241*** 0.254*** 0.198*** 0.212*** 0.193** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.011) 
      
Savings 0.0471*** 0.0491*** 0.0526*** 0.0544*** 0.0517*** 
Rate (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Ln Trade 0.658***  0.617***   
Share (M1) (0.000)  (0.000)   
      
Ln Trade  0.781***  0.735***  
Share (M4)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
      
Ln Trade     0.549*** 
Share (M10)     (0.000) 
      
_cons 1.257 1.376* 1.685* 1.780** 1.882** 
 (0.131) (0.098) (0.054) (0.041) (0.043) 
N 1515 1515 1408 1408 1408 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Estimating variations of equations 64 using random effects estimation procedure with the inclusion of time fixed 
effects for all columns 
Ln Trade share (Mi) is the natural log of the estimated instrument of trade as a fraction of GDP from model Mi in the 
first stage. N is the number of data points used in each column 
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The coefficient alone is not enough to determine the contribution of trade to growth due to the fact 
that different specifications yield different trade estimates. I will address this issue in section 3.3.4 
by estimating the share of each trade instrument on growth over time.  
3.3.3.3 Stage 2 Robustness Checks 
3.3.3.3.1 Accounting for Institutions 
One could argue that since the risk measure of a country is another measure of its institutional 
quality, the added benefit observed so far is just a reflection of the contributions of institutional 
quality to growth and not the trade connection, due to the correlation between general institutional 
quality and the risk-infused trade measure. To address this, I carry out robustness checks that 
control for other institutional measures namely level of corruption, rule of law and government 
efficiency.  
Table 24: Robustness checks for the effects of trade on growth (Institutional quality) 
 Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Population 26.10*** 26.16*** 26.63*** 26.64*** 25.82*** 25.72*** 
Growth (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln Area 0.224*** 0.234*** 0.231*** 0.235*** 0.195*** 0.200*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) 
Savings  0.0478*** 0.0498*** 0.0473*** 0.0494*** 0.0484*** 0.0504*** 
Rate (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln Trade 0.615***  0.635***  0.557***  
Share (M1) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Ln Trade  0.725***  0.735***  0.653*** 
Share (M2)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Government -0.00458 -0.00512     
Efficiency (0.537) (0.484)     
Corruption   -0.00218 -0.00394   
   (0.773) (0.589)   
Rule of Law     -0.0107 -0.0122* 
     (0.143) (0.082) 
Constant       
 1.633 1.788* 1.453 1.723 2.177** 2.405** 
N (0.113) (0.079) (0.176) (0.101) (0.036) (0.018) 
 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Estimating variations of equation 64 using random effects estimation procedure (controlling for Institutions) 
Ln Trade share (Mi) is the natural log of the estimated instrument of trade as a fraction of GDP from model Mi in the 
first stage.  
N is the number of data points used in each column 
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The expectation is that the inclusion of other institutional variables will eliminate or at least, 
significantly decrease the relationship between the growth rate and the instrument of trade with 
risk measures (i.e. an elimination of the significance or a significant reduction of the coefficient). 
Table 24 above shows the results of these robustness checks. I observe a fairly robust measure of 
trade with a reduction coming from the inclusion of the rule of law measure of institution. The 
reduced coefficient still statistically significant, is larger than that of the instrument with distance 
alone, suggesting that the improved relationship due to the introduction of the risk measures is not 
just a consequence of the effect of institutional quality on growth. 
3.3.3.3.2 Accounting for Human Capital Accumulation 
It has been well established that human capital development is essential to growth and productivity 
(Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992). Data on this factor however for the time period examined is not 
as comprehensive, as the inclusion of measures of this variable reduce the sample size by half. In 
order to generalize the conclusions in this study as much as possible, human capital accumulation 
is not introduced in the main regression analysis, but the impact of human capital inclusion on the 
effect of the trade share instruments on growth is estimated in this section, in order to determine if 
the inclusion would significantly change the findings.  I use three proxies for human capital 
accumulation to test this: Government expenditure on tertiary institutions as a fraction of 
government expenditure on education (GET), Government expenditure on Education in Total as a 
fraction of total government expenditure (GEE) and net enrolment of secondary school students 
as a fraction of the total population of children of secondary school age, (NE). Table 25 below 
shows the results of this robustness check. From table 5, none of the measures of human capital 
accumulation significantly alters the estimates of the effect of trade shares on growth rates. As a 
result, I go ahead and estimate the contribution of these instruments of trade on growth over time, 
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using the results from estimations without human capital accumulation measures. 
3.3.3.4 Estimating the contribution of trade to growth 
 Next, I estimate the contribution of the different trade instruments to growth over time. To do 
this, I re-estimate equation (64) using the natural log of one plus trade share as opposed to the 
natural log of trade share63. Each trade instrument is multiplied by its coefficient, and the ratio of 
this multiple to growth is taken and averaged over all countries for each year. The variable 
obtained is the contribution of the different instruments of trade shares to growth rates. Figure 18 
below shows a plot of these contributions over time, comparing models 1 and 4 from stage one, 
while figure 19 shows the plot over time comparing models 1, 4 and 10 from stage one64. 
       Figure 18           Figure 19 
              
 
                                                          
63 This simply makes the calculation of the share easier as adding one to the trade shares before taking logs creates 
positive entries (as opposed to log of proper fractions which are negative). The results we obtain from the regression 
analysis are not significantly different and can be found in table C-1 of the appendix to this chapter. 
64 This is done to ensure accurate comparisons between measures due to the fact that data is unavailable for some 
countries in some time periods. Figure one has 1515 observations while figure 2 has 1408 observations. 
 
 
Table 25: Robustness check for effects of trade on growth (Human capital Accumulation) 
 Growth Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Population 17.40 18.63 13.66 15.22 39.11*** 40.02*** 18.21 19.62 14.82 16.45 40.61*** 41.62*** 
Growth (0.217) (0.188) (0.327) (0.274) (0.001) (0.001) (0.192) (0.160) (0.288) (0.237) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Ln area 0.231*** 0.221*** 0.168** 0.172** 0.225*** 0.226*** 0.252*** 0.240*** 0.181** 0.184** 0.239*** 0.239*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.041) (0.035) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.033) (0.030) (0.001) (0.001) 
             
Savings 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.0847*** 0.0844*** 0.0738*** 0.0708*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.0870*** 0.0868*** 0.0767*** 0.0740*** 
Rate (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Ln Trade 0.685*** 0.669*** 0.681*** 0.689*** 0.601*** 0.640***       
Share (M1) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
             
Ln Trade       0.819*** 0.801*** 0.800*** 0.808*** 0.723*** 0.766*** 
Share (M2)       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
GET  -0.0224      -0.0275     
  (0.291)      (0.190)     
             
GEE    -0.0867**      -0.0860**   
    (0.017)      (0.019)   
             
NE      0.00973      0.00935 
      (0.228)      (0.242) 
             
_cons 0.123 0.638 1.273 2.584** -0.0878 -0.669 0.119 0.746 1.432 2.753** 0.0293 -0.518 
 (0.908) (0.586) (0.234) (0.031) (0.925) (0.525) (0.910) (0.519) (0.192) (0.025) (0.976) (0.626) 
N 742 742 875 875 752 752 742 742 870 870 743 743 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Estimating variations of equations 64 using random effects estimation procedure 
Ln Trade share (Mi) is the natural log of the estimated instrument of trade as a fraction of GDP from model Mi in the first stage. GET is Government expenditure 
on tertiary institutions as a fraction of government expenditure on education, GEE is Government expenditure on Education in total as a fraction of total 
government expenditure and NE is the net enrolment of secondary school students as a fraction of the total population of children of secondary school age. N is 
the number of data points used in each column 
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Both figures show first and formost that the trade instrument with risk shows a higher level of 
contribution to growth than the measure without, suggesting that the contribution of trade to 
growth has been underestimated due to the fact that the trade instrument with risk, better matches 
observed trade. Figure 19 however, shows that the inclusion of risk mitigating factors points to an 
overestimation of the trade contribution to growth. The introduction of model 10 depicts a lower 
contribution during the initial periods of the financial crisis when the very financial instruments 
designed to mitigate these risks generated risks of their own, leading to distrust of these financial 
instruments and as such, a decline in the contribution of trade to growth. But, as is observed from 
2009, the return of trust to the financial system once again increases the share of trade in growth.  
3.3.3.5 Addressing the role of trade in developing and developed countries 
In chapter 2, it is suggested that fact that poorer countries tend to be riskier, the effect of trade on 
growth may differ between developed and developed countries, as potential trading opportunities 
between developed and developing countries might not happen due to the risky nature of the 
developing countries. To test this hypothesis, a dummy variable is introduced and interacted with 
the risk measure of country i. Using the Human Development Index (HDI), the dummy variable 
takes a value of “0” if the country is ranked in the top 50 and a value of “1” if it is ranked below 
50. In essence, I run the following regression 
0 1 2 3 4ln ln *lnit t it it it itgro pop sav ts Dev ts                (65) 
Where “Dev” is the development level indicator described above and everything else is same as in 
equation 64. Table 26 below captures the results of the regressions. 
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Table 26: Role of trade on growth (Development-Trade instrument interaction) 
 Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Population  22.74*** 22.79*** 27.25*** 23.24*** 23.45*** 27.08*** 
Growth (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
       
Ln of Area 0.286*** 0.302*** 0.309*** 0.288*** 0.293*** 0.279*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Savings Rate 0.0426*** 0.0438*** 0.0402*** 0.0437*** 0.0455*** 0.0440*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Ln of trade share 0.602***   0.726***   
M1 (0.000)   (0.000)   
       
Ln of trade share  0.685***   0.837***  
M4  (0.000)   (0.000)  
       
Ln of trade share   0.525***   0.731*** 
M10   (0.000)   (0.000) 
       
       
Dev*Ln of trade     -0.365***   
share M1    (0.008)   
       
Dev*Ln of trade      -0.407***  
share M4     (0.003)  
       
Dev*Ln of trade       -0.485*** 
share M10      (0.001) 
       
_cons 0.796 0.814 0.719 0.727 0.818 0.803 
 (0.363) (0.352) (0.439) (0.392) (0.331) (0.362) 
N 1397 1397 1397 1397 1397 1397 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Estimating variations of equation 65 using random effects estimation procedure 
Ln Trade share (Mi) is the natural log of the estimated instrument of trade as a fraction of GDP from model Mi in the 
first stage. Dev is the indicator variable with 0 for countries ranked in the top 50 according to the Human 
development index and 1 for those ranked below 50. N is the number of data points used in each column 
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Columns 1, 2 and 3 in table 26 above serve as bench marks with which to compare the introduction 
of the interaction term. Columns 4, 5 and 6 show the regression results with the interaction term 
included. The most obvious observation is that all models carry a negative sign when the 
interaction term is introduced. This implies that  
2
0
growth growth
Dev Lntrade Dev Lntrade
   
      
 
Suggesting that the closer to one the dummy variable “DEV” (meaning the less developed), the 
lower the impact of trade on growth. This indicates that the developing countries benefit less from 
trade than their developing counterparts. Furthermore, comparing models 1 and 4 in columns 4 
and 5 of Table 26, it is observed that the absolute value of the coefficient of the interaction term 
increases as we introduce risk. This is an indicator that the risky nature of developing countries 
contributes to the reduced effect of trade on growth, providing evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that risk impacts trade more negatively in developing countries than in developed 
countries. The same trend is observed when financial depth is introduced in column 6, as it is well 
established that developing countries tend to have lower financial depth and hence, cannot provide 
sufficient hedging against risk as is the case for their developed counterparts. This also suggests 
that the effect of trade on growth diminishes with the level of development. 
3.3.3.6 Addressing the role of imports and exports respectively on trade. 
Finally, as was highlighted in earlier sections in this chapter, trade has been shown to be beneficial 
to growth rate of an economy, however it is still unclear what portion of this is due to export or 
imports. In this subsection, I disaggregate trade into its components (exports and imports) and 
repeat stages one and two above for each, in order to highlight the contribution of exports and 
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imports respectively to growth. Tables C-2 and C-3 in the appendix capture the stage one results 
which are used to generate instruments for exports and imports, while table C-4 in the appendix 
captures the stage two results of the impact of imports and exports on growth. Figures 20 and 21 
below show the differences in export and import contributions when considering distance alone 
and when risk is introduced. The same misspecification is observed in both figures similar to those 
in the total trade graphs above.  
Figure 20: Import contribution to growth  Figure 21: Export contribution to growth 
        
Figures 22 and 23 below highlight the contribution of each component of trade as well as the total 
trade contriubution wth each model specification respectively. We find that in both model 
specifications, trade contributions are driven primarily by imports, as declines and increases in 
import contribution to growth are mirrored by the total trade contribution to growth, with exports 
contribution being relatively smooth over time, with the exception of the financial crisis. It is also 
observed in light with earlier findings, that the introduction of risk measures, imply that the 
contribution of trade to growth has been underestimated.  
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                     Figure 22: Import and Export contribution to growth (Without Risk)   
  
Figure 23: Import and Export contribution to growth (Without Risk) 
            
3.4 Conclusion  
In this paper, I set out to determine the effect of the introduction of exogenous measures of risk in 
trade flows on the role of trade in growth. This is first theoretically estimated and it is observed 
that the determinants of trade flow impact the rate of growth. Focusing primarily of distance (as a 
proxy for transportation costs) and risks form supply and demand shocks (proxied by the measures 
of political stability and the presence of terrorist attacks and growth rates of partner countries in 
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the empirical analysis), I find that an increase in risk or distance measures negatively impacts the 
growth rates of economies. Furthermore, this effect is tested empirically by comparing the effect 
of two intrusments for trade flows (one with risk measures and one without) on growth rates. I 
find, in line with the results of the theoretical study, that the both measures yield significantly 
different responses to growth with the contribution of the instrument with risk to growth being 
significantly larger than the instrument without. With the instrument containing risk being the most 
correlated with observed trade flows, I conclude that previous empirical estimates of the role of 
trade in growth have been underestimated. I however findcause for caution upon introducing 
measures for risk mitigation (proxied by measures of financial depth). The inclusion of these 
measures give rise to instruments that match observed trade flows even more closely than just risk 
measures alone, and sometimes show a smaller (or larger) role for trade in growth than estimated 
by the instrument with risk measures and the instrument with just distance. This points to the partial 
elimination of price related risk in a financially developed environment that could potentially 
hinder trade and the effect of the collapse of the global financial system during the geat recession 
of 2008. This finding of the relevance of risk in detremining trade flows and subsequently growth 
is important as it ties directly to potential growth enhancing policies geared towards developing 
countries that have been suggested in the past. Suggestions like a focus on outward oriented trade 
policies designed to encourage domestic producers to export and therefore drive growth are 
doomed to fail, all else equal, if it is not supplemented by policies that improve macroeconomic 
stability. Finally, the popular notion that trade between developed and developing countries can 
be stimulated if there is a reduction in both tariff and non tariff barriers in the developed countries 
will also prove ineffective, and would only serve to increase trade between develpoed countries 
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and as a result, will have little effect on the devloping economies if not accompanied by these 
policies to ensure stability.  
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Appendix 3.1 
1. Aggregating the cost function  
1 2 31 1 1 ... 1 MNd d d d            
     1 2 ... M
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2. Explaining aggregation of expected capital 
Consider the set of real numbers which is a field satisfying the following axioms 
1. Closure: if a  and b  then a b and .a b  
2. Existence of inverse under multiplication and addition: If a  , then 
1
and a
a
   
(There are other axioms such as associativity, commutativity and identity, but I do not 
need these for the following proof) 
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By definition, 0 1 because 
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  (due to the fact that 0 1i  ) 
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Where tm = 
1
MN
i
i
m

  
3. The full specification of the Lagrangian with alternative Bellman specification following 
    
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(A.2) resolves to  1 1 1 1, 1Dt t t tf k M             
 (A.4) (equation 16 in paper) 
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(equation 17 in paper) 
From 4 Euler equation is given as
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Alternatively, the infinite horizon problem can be rewritten as a Bellman equation 
(principle of optimality) and the solution of the function that satisfies the following 
equation also solves the infinite sequence problem 
     1maxD Dt t tV k u c V k          (A.7) 
The state variable is D
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D
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        1M Xt t t tM R R C D C D x    
First order conditions  
With respect to choice variables 
   1: ' ' 0Dt t tc u c V k           (A.8) 
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With respect to the State variable 
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(A.13) therefore implies that 
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Therefore the Euler equation =
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(same as A.6 above). Equation (A.9) also resolves to equation (A.5) above. 
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Appendix 3.2 
Table C-1: Re-estimation of equation 63 with Ln (1+trade share) 
 Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Population 26.86*** 26.20*** 22.85*** 22.19*** 25.87*** 
Growth (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) 
      
Ln area 0.203*** 0.208*** 0.157** 0.162** 0.160** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.032) (0.027) (0.035) 
      
Savings 0.0405*** 0.0430*** 0.0468*** 0.0492*** 0.0484*** 
Rate (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Trade 
share 
1.625***  1.462***   
Model 1 (0.000)  (0.000)   
      
Trade 
share 
     
Model 4  2.339***  2.127***  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Trade 
share 
     
Model 10     2.217*** 
     (0.002) 
cons 0.142 -0.0394 0.720 0.547 0.796 
 (0.875) (0.966) (0.447) (0.567) (0.427) 
N 1515 1515 1408 1408 1408 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Estimating variations of equation 64 using random effects estimation procedure with the inclusion of time fixed 
effects for all columns 
Trade share (Model i) is the log of one plus estimated instrument of trade as a fraction of GDP from model Mi in the 
first stage.  
N is the number of data points used in each column 
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Table C-2: Generating Instruments for Exports 
 
 Ln Exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln Distance -1.5*** -1.5*** -1.464*** -1.464*** -1.469*** 
      
Ln Population 1.4*** 1.356*** 1.293*** 1.292*** 1.091*** 
(partner j)      
      
Ln Population 1.6*** 1.648*** 1.621*** 1.621*** 1.432*** 
(Country i)      
Ln Area -0.5*** -0.431*** -0.389*** -0.389*** -0.233*** 
(Country i)      
Ln Area       
(Partner j) -0.5*** -0.415*** -0.362*** -0.362*** -0.211*** 
      
Country i  0.0178*** 0.0218*** 0.0220*** 0.0197*** 
Risk       
      
Partner j  0.0110*** 0.0126*** 0.0123*** 0.00995*** 
Risk      
      
Lag Growth   0.00194*** 0.00166*** 0.00516*** 
Partner j       
      
Relrisk    -0.00241*** -0.00126** 
      
DCP     0.0121*** 
country i      
      
DCP     0.0106*** 
Partner j      
      
_cons -10.0*** -12.97*** -12.80*** -12.76*** -11.17*** 
N 230087 228515 207073 206914 180640 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Table shows estimates of 
variations of equation 60 using random effects estimation procedure. All variables from equation 60 are 
included in the regression but only relevant variables are reported.“Relrisk” is a ratio of partner country risks 
and “DCP is domestic credit to the private sector, and N is the number of data points used in each column 
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Table C-3: Generating Instruments for Imports 
 Ln Imports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln Distance -0.0217 -0.0172 -0.0348 -0.0351 -0.00139 
 (0.555) (0.642) (0.340) (0.336) (0.970) 
      
Ln Population 0.856*** 0.855*** 0.683*** 0.681*** 0.397*** 
(partner j) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Ln Population 1.057*** 1.065*** 0.919*** 0.917*** 0.675*** 
(Country i) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln Area      
(Country i) -0.433*** -0.425*** -0.332*** -0.331*** -0.179*** 
Ln Area  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(Partner j)      
Ln Distance -0.513*** -0.507*** -0.404*** -0.403*** -0.219*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Country i  0.00326*** 0.00433*** 0.00439*** 0.00455*** 
Risk   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Partner j  -0.0000835 0.000576 0.000485 -0.000270 
Risk  (0.878) (0.320) (0.406) (0.671) 
      
Lag Growth   0.000143 -0.000314 0.00201*** 
Partner j    (0.808) (0.602) (0.003) 
      
Relrisk    -0.000698 -0.000108 
    (0.345) (0.909) 
      
      
PPD     0.00804*** 
country i     (0.000) 
      
PPD     0.00670*** 
Partner j     (0.000) 
      
_cons -4.982*** -5.452*** -2.529*** -2.494*** 0.990* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.062) 
N 236312 234197 210414 210183 166353 
      
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Table shows estimates of 
variations of equations 60 using random effects estimation procedure. All variables from equation 60 are 
included in the regression but only relevant variables are reported.“Relrisk” is a ratio of partner country risks 
and “PPD” is private credit by domestic money banks and, and N is the number of data points used in each 
column 
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Table C-4: Establishing the role of Exports and Imports individually on growth 
 Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Population Growth 20.54** 20.90*** 24.59*** 24.15*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ln of area 0.259*** 0.275*** 0.171** 0.190** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.025) (0.014) 
Savings Rate 0.0573*** 0.0584*** 0.0453*** 0.0479*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln of Import share 0.421***    
(Without risk) (0.008)    
     
Ln of Export share 0.267**    
(Without Risk)  (0.021)    
Ln of Import share  0.494***   
(With risk)  (0.000)   
     
Ln of Export share  0.312***   
(With Risk)   (0.006)   
     
Ln of 1+Import share   11.15*  
(Without risk)   (0.067)  
     
(Ln of 1+Import share)^2   -33.78**  
(Without risk)   (0.015)  
     
Ln of Export share   1.355***  
(Without Risk)    (0.000)  
     
Ln of 1+Import share    19.97** 
(With risk)    (0.017) 
     
(Ln of 1+Import share)^2    -70.90*** 
(With risk)    (0.009) 
     
Ln of Export share    1.877*** 
(With Risk)     (0.000) 
     
_cons 2.396*** 2.668*** 0.563 0.136 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.585) (0.897) 
N 1408 1408 1408 1408 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Estimating variations of equations 64 using random effects estimation procedure with the inclusion of time 
fixed effects for all columns 
Ln Export(Import) share is the natural log of the estimated instrument of trade as a fraction of GDP from 
the models with and without risk in the first stage. N is the number of data points used in each column 
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Table C-5:  Table of Variable sources and descriptions 
Variable Description Source 
Bilateral 
Exports & 
Imports 
Value of total exports from 
a country to each trading 
partner 
International Monetary Fund Database. 
data.imf.org 
Distance Arial distance between 
trading pairs 
French Research Center in International Economics  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8 
GDP/Growth 
rates 
Gross Domestic Product of 
each Country/change in 
GDP for each country 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators  
Population Number of people in each 
country 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators 
Area Surface area is a country's 
total area, including areas 
under inland bodies of water 
and some coastal waterways 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators 
Risk Measure Political stability of the 
Governments and the 
presence of terrorism in 
each country 
World Bank World Governance Indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-
indicators 
Common 
language 
0 if no common language 
and 1 if both countries in a 
pair speak the same 
language 
French Research Center in International Economics  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8 
Contiguous 1 if both countries share a 
border and 0 if they do not 
French Research Center in International Economics  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8 
Col45 1 if both countries have had 
a colonial relationship after 
1945 and 0 if they do night 
French Research Center in International Economics  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8 
Comcol 1 if both countries have 
been colonized by the same 
country and 0 if they do not. 
French Research Center in International Economics  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8 
Curcol 1 if trading partners are 
currently in a colonial 
relationship 0 otherwise 
French Research Center in International Economics  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8 
colony 1 if one country in a pair 
was colonized by the other, 
and 0 otherwise 
French Research Center in International Economics  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.
asp?id=8 
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Table C.4 (cont.) 
Variable Description Source 
Rule of Law Rule of Law captures 
perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the 
quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence 
World Bank World Governance Indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-
indicators 
Corruption Control of Corruption captures 
perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is 
exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites 
and private interests 
World Bank World Governance Indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-
indicators 
Government 
effectiveness 
Government Effectiveness 
captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies 
World Bank World Governance Indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-
indicators 
Savings rate Gross savings (% of GNI) 
 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators 
DCP Domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators 
LL Liquid liabilities to GDP 
(%) 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators 
PPD Private credit by deposit 
money banks to GDP (%) 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators 
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Table C-4 (cont.) 
Variable Description Source 
PPDF Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other 
financial institutions to 
GDP (%) 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators 
NE Net enrollment rate is the 
ratio of children of official 
school age who are enrolled 
in school to the population 
of the corresponding 
official school age 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators 
GEE Expenditure on education as 
% of total government 
expenditure 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators 
GET Expenditure on tertiary as % 
of government expenditure 
on education (%) 
 
World Bank World development indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselect
ion/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
UCHECHUKWU AUGUSTINE JARRETT 
Curriculum Vitae  
May, 2016 
 
Department of Economics 
University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee 
P. O. Box 413 
Milwaukee, WI 53201 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 
2012 to 2016                University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee 
   Wisconsin. USA. 
 
   Ph.D. Economics, May 2016 
 
2005 - 2009 University of Lagos, Akoka, 
 Lagos State. Nigeria. 
 
B.Sc. Mathematics & Statistics (1st Class Honors) 
 
Honors and Awards 
 
 William L. Holahan Prize for Outstanding Teaching by a Graduate Student (2015) 
 
 University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Chancellor’s Graduate student award, 2012 and 2013 
 
 Member of the winning team in the Nigerian National mathematics competition for University 
Students (NAMCUS 2010) 
 
 
Language(s) Spoken: English (Native Speaker) 
 
Working Papers 
2015 “Is Nigeria Over dependent on oil?” 
2016                               “The Path from Risk to growth, through Trade” (with Hamid Mohtadi) 
2016 “The Role of Risk in Bilateral Trade” (with Hamid Mohtadi) 
2016 “The Transmission of the Great Recession and the Role of Openness: A    
Counterfactual Diagnosis” (with Hamid Mohtadi)  
 
Areas of interest 
 
TEACHING: Microeconomics, Economics of personal finance, Macroeconomics, Growth and 
Development, and International Economic relations.  
 
RESEARCH: Macroeconomics, Applied econometrics, Development Economics, Finance, 
Monetary Economics and International Economics 
140 
 
 
Teaching Experience 
 
Fall 2012 – Spring 2013  Discussion sections in Principles of Microeconomics 
Fall 2013 – Summer 2014 Principles of Microeconomics 
Fall 2014 – Spring 2016  Economics of Personal Finance 
Fall 2014 – Spring 2015,           Intermediate Microeconomics 
Spring 2016   
Fall 2015    Introduction to International Economic Relations 
Fall 2014 to date  Upward Bound Math Tutor 
Summer 2015   UW-Milwaukee Summer Bridge Financial Literacy Lecturer 
  
Work Experience 
 
2016 to date   Department of Economics 
   University of Nebraska, Lincoln 
   Assistant Professor of Practice 
 
2012 to 2016  Department of Economics, 
   University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
 
2012 - 2013  Teaching Assistant (Principles of Microeconomics) 
2013 - 2014  Grader (Industrial organization and Intermediate Macroeconomics) 
2013 to date Instructor (Principles of Microeconomics, Intermediate Microeconomics, 
Economics of personal finance, Introduction to international Economic relations) 
    
 
2014 to 2016  Tutor 
   Upward bound, 
   University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
    
Summer 2015  Lecturer 
   Summer Bridge Program, 
   University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
      
2010 to 2011 Graduate Assistant, 
   Department of Mathematics and Computer Sciences, 
 University of Ado-Ekiti 
 
 
Referee Activity 
International Economic Journal, African Development Review 
 
